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CLIMATE CHANGE 
THREATENS THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 
Few warnings have been more dangerously ignored than that of climate change. 
Unlike a catastrophe that strikes once, climate change is a slowly unfolding 
disaster. The potential damage caused by climate change is so severe that it 
threatens the livelihoods of millions of people. Climate change speaks directly to 
poverty. Few other single issues present such a danger to the future welfare of the 
world’s poor.
Climate change is a threat not only to the wellbeing of poor people. Its impact may 
increase violence in drought-hit areas in Kenya and, when increased quantities of 
melting water from the Himalayan glaciers sweep away their land and livelihoods, 
people in Bangladesh will be forced to abandon their homes.
Although the facts in this report are harsh, it is also our intention to bring a mes-
sage of hope. The time span for reducing emissions is limited; however, decision 
makers now have the facts on the table and it is time to act.
Norwegian Church Aid and Church of Sweden believe that we human beings have 
a duty to manage our natural resources and the global environment in a sustain-
able manner so we do not jeopardize the lives of future generations. God has given 
the earth, nature and the environment to the whole of mankind. No one generation 
or group has the right to exploit these resources for their own greed or at the cost 
of future generations.
We are now intensifying our advocacy work on the issue of climate change. We 
advocate that rich countries must bear the main responsibility for reducing green-
house gas emissions and facilitate the development and transfer of climate-
friendly technology that will benefit developing countries. It is no longer possible to 
ignore climate change adaptation as an element in development work. Increased 
support for developing countries that will enable them to adjust to climate change 
is urgently needed. 
We also add our voices to those that demand that governments across the globe, 
and in particular our own governments, demonstrate bold leadership in working 
for a responsible and ambitious post-Kyoto agreement. 
It is our hope that this report will add another perspective to the debate on climate
change and stimulate much needed action.
March 2007
Atle Sommerfeldt 
Secretary General
Norwegian Church Aid
Margareta Grape
Director international affairs
Church of Sweden
By Norwegian Church Aid and Church of Sweden
KEY FACTS 
Disasters as 
drought, cold 
periods, fires 
and floods have 
always been a 
part of life in 
Bangladesh. The 
country has large 
rivers and poor 
inhabitants with 
houses that are 
very vulnerable 
for nature 
disasters. 
Photo: Norwegian 
Church Aid
”Friday, 2 February 2007 may go down in history as the day when the question 
mark was removed from the question of whether climate change has anything to 
do with human activities.”
        Achim Steiner, executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme.1
In 1988 the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the World Me-
trological Office (WMO) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to provide independent scientific advice on the issue of climate change, its 
evidences and predictions. The first assessment report of the IPCC served as the 
basis for negotiating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The 4th assessment report, published in February 2007, has a level 
of confidence that is much greater than what could be achieved in 2001 when the 
IPCC issued its last major report: it makes the conclusion that the global climate 
changes are down to human activities and that the changes in the atmosphere, the 
oceans and glaciers and ice caps show indisputably that the world is warming. 
The world’s average surface temperature has increased by around 0.74°C over the 
past 100 years. Dependent on future emissions scenarios, global temperatures co-
uld increase by 1,1-6,4°C by 2100. The increase is very likely to be in the range 2 to 
4.5°C, with the best estimate of about 3°C, and is very unlikely to be less than 1.5°C. 
Values higher than 4.5°C cannot be excluded2.  
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6324425.stm
2 IPCC, 2007
For the first time, the report provides evidence that the ice sheets of Antarctica 
and Greenland are slowly losing mass and contributing to sea level rise. Glaciers 
are shrinking and sea levels are rising far more rapidly than anticipated. According 
to the IPCC sea-level rise might be 28-58 cm by 2100. However, the international 
research institute Met Office Hadley Centre predicts that a irreversible melting 
of the Greenland ice-cap will occur at a local increase of the temperature of 3°C, 
which equalize with a global increase of 1,5°C3. Met Office Hadley Centre further 
indicates that the melting of the Greenland ice-cap may lead to a yearly 5 mm sea 
level rise. In a time span of 100 years this prediction leads to a 50 cm sea level rise 
and up to 5 meter sea level rise during 1000 years4. 
Most of the observed increase in global averaged temperatures since the mid-20th 
century is in IPCC language very likely due to the observed increase in greenhouse 
gas concentrations5. The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due 
primarily to fossil fuel use. The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
has increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 ppm to 379 ppm3 in 2005 
and GHG- emissions are still rising. In 2006, the International Energy Agency (IEA)6 
predicted that CO2 emissions would increase by another 55% by the year 2030. 
The 0.74 °C rise we have seen between 1906-2005 is already bringing hunger, 
destitution and death to millions of the world’s most vulnerable people. A 
warming of about 0.2°C is projected for each of the next two decades.
  Sub-Saharan Africa: Dry areas will get drier and wet areas wetter, more 
extreme weather, more intense and longer droughts. 
  Asia: Sea level rise and an increase in intensity of tropical cyclones as well as 
decrease in water supply, droughts, cyclones and intense rainfall events. 
  Latin America: Increased droughts, increased floods and landslides, heat 
outbreaks, forest fires and loss of coastal land and biodiversity. 
  The snow and glaciers that covered Mt. Kenya have almost disappeared and 
Kilimanjaro has lost some 82 percent of its mass since 19827. This is devastating 
for the people on the African continent. They depend on the snow and glaciers of 
Mt. Kenya as a critical source of water for growing food and making a living. 
Because of large-scale groundwater reduction, the melting has led to more 
drought than floods pushing people to leave their land and migrate. 
  Extreme weather events, such as tropical cyclones, are likely to become 
increasingly intense, involving heavy rainfall, high winds and storm surges8. 
3 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/index.html
4 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/index.html
5 http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf
 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/summaries2006/English.pdf
7 http://www.grida.no/climate/vitalafrica/english/03.htm
8 http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf
The Red Cross (2003) claims in a study that weather-related disasters are 
increasing and has affected 2.5 billion people and causing more than US$ 400 
billion of damage over the past decade9. At this present moment Mozambique 
experiences devastating floods. The floods have hit some 80,000 people. 
Flooding is common during the southern Africa rainy season, but OCHA states 
that this flood is more wide spread and also that it occurred earlier. An estima-
ted 40,000 hectares of crops have been lost in Mozambique under the floods in 
February this year. Taken as a single episode, Mozambique’s experience under-
lines how climatic events can roll back development gains across a broad front.
  The glaciers of the Himalayas and Tibet, the “Water Towers of Asia”, alone 
feed seven of the world’s greatest rivers — Brahmaputra, the Ganges, Indus, 
Irrawady, Mekong, Salween and Yangtze — that provide water supplies for more 
than 2 billion people10. 
  In the semi-arid Northeast Brazil, with the lowest level of human 
development in Latin America, global warming has accelerated desertification 
with the consequences of rising poverty, hunger and migration11. Up to 75% of 
land in the north east, which is plagued by periodic drought, is at risk of beco-
ming desert12. The already harsh environment makes more intense droughts 
devastating for the already impoverish population, with recorded losses on 
agricultural production sometimes exceeding 60%13. One in five Brazilians born 
in the arid north-east of the country moved to another region within Brazil. 
  The melting of the glaciers and the increased water flows are particularly 
affecting low-lying regions. Bangladesh lies at less than 5 meters above sea 
level and these regions support more than 110 million people. In most Pacific 
islands, the people, agricultural land, tourist resorts and infrastructure are 
concentrated in the coastal zones, and are especially vulnerable to any rise in 
sea level14. The population of Tuvalu, a group of eight Pacific islands north-east 
of Australia, is already being evacuated; nearly 3,000 Tuvalans have left so far15. 
  The IPCC has estimated, in their report from 2001, that by 2050, a combina-
tion of rising sea levels, erosion and agricultural damage due to climate change 
could make 150 million people environmental refugees. A movement of people 
on this scale will cause major social and economic upheaval and conflict. It is 
very likely that global warming, more than war or political upheaval, stands to 
displace many millions of people. 
9 http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5XRFZB/$File/ClimateChange_Report_
FINAL_ENG.pdf
10 http://hdr.undp.org/
11 http://hdr.undp.org/
12 http://www.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/News/Feeling%20the%20Heat%20Tearfund%20report.pdf
13  http://www.wmo.ch/Madrid07/confmadrid/Policy%20%20Planning%202.pdf 
14  http://www.unescap.org/mced2000/pacific/background/AOSIS.htm
15  A citizen’s guide to climate refugees. Friends of the Earth Australia, 2005
  2005 study by the World Health Organization indicated that global climate 
change is directly tied to increased rates of malaria, malnutrition, and 
diarrhoea. It estimated that climate change contributes to 150,000 deaths and 
5 million illnesses each year16.
  Climate change impacts on agriculture could increase the number of people 
at risk of hunger. The impact of climate change on food security will be higher 
in those countries with low economic growth potential that currently have high 
malnourishment levels. In some 40 poor, developing countries, with a 
combined population of 2 billion, including 450 million undernourished people, 
production losses due to climate change may drastically increase the number 
of undernourished people, severely hindering progress in combating poverty 
and food insecurity17.  
  For every degree Celsius increase in the tropics and subtropics agricultural 
harvests are expected to decrease by 10%18. 
  An FAO/IIASA study indicates that the developing world would experience 
an 11% decrease in cultivable rainfed land, with consequent decline in cereal 
production. Sixty-five developing countries, representing more than half the 
developing world’s total population in 1995, will lose about 280 million tons of 
potential cereal production as a result of climate change. This loss, valued at 
an average of US$ 200 per ton, totals US$ 56 billion, equivalent to some 16% 
of the agricultural gross domestic product of these countries in 1995. Some 29 
African countries face an aggregate loss of around 35 million tons in potential 
cereal production. In the case of Asia, the impact of climate change is mixed: 
India loses 125 million tons, equivalent to 18% of its rainfed cereal production; 
China’s rainfed cereal production potential of 360 million tons, on the other 
hand, increases by 15%19. 
16 http://www.who.int/globalchange/publications/infectdiseases.pdf
17 Background document, FAO, 31st session of the Committee on World Food Security, 2005
18 Brown, Lester, 2004, ”Outgrowing the earth”
19 Background document, FAO, 31st Session of the Committee on World Food Security, 2005
Once Sambarwawa had water, now it has bodies. Following prolonged drought, 
animal carcasses litter the valley and the stench of decay pervades the remote 
village of Sambarwawa in the heart of the northern Kenyan district of Isiolo. 
But Sambarwawa is not only a graveyard for the animals of local livestock 
farmers. Some of these nomadic herders – known as pastoralists – have also 
died because of the drought; not from starvation or thirst, but as a result of 
escalating conflict in the area. They were murdered for their water. 
Sambarwawa is a place where groups of pastoralists congregate in times of 
drought. Each group is allocated a space on the dry river bed to drill a bore-
hole for water. They are allowed to bring their animals to drink here once every 
four days. ‘It’s a sort of cafeteria system to ensure everybody has a chance to 
get water for their animals,’ says local leader Wako Liba. 
KENYA: DROUGHT AND CONFLICT
Elim Lokeris, 45, 
was shot in the back 
and had his stomach
slashed open by 
raiders who stole his 
entire herd of 380
animals. He was 
hospitalised for two 
years.
Photo: Christian Aid/
Maxwell Agwanda
‘Climate change will make it impossible for the world to achieve the millennium 
development goals. Poverty is bound to increase. Food security is bound to get worse. 
People will be spending a lot of money trying to deal with food security and thereby 
deal with poverty and in the end there will be no solution.’
       Professor Richard Odingo, vice-chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
By Katy Migiro and Dominic Nutt
But the system has been under extraordinary strain for years because of  
almost a decade of drought1. By December last year, some 10,000 herders with 
200,000 animals had descended on tiny Sambarwawa, many trekking 400km 
from the epicentre of the drought in the east. Although the village had not seen 
rain for a year, they knew they could still find water under the riverbed. But 
then the boreholes began to dry up. 
‘As the water level dropped, I foresaw conflict,’ says Liba. ‘Some herders 
started encroaching on boreholes owned by different communities. As one 
group pushed to water its livestock, another moved to restrict access to the few 
boreholes that had enough water.’ 
In December, as the drought intensified, the pressure finally led to killings. 
‘Gunshots reverberated the whole night,’ Liba recalls. ‘By the time I came 
down, seven people had died. There were dozens of injuries. Animal carcasses 
littered almost a kilometre stretch of the valley.’ 
David Kheyle, 37, was queuing for water when fighting broke out. ‘There was 
grumbling that evening. A good number of boreholes didn’t have water so the 
queues were relentless,’ he says.
‘People were becoming impatient. Suddenly there was a scramble at the 
northern end of the valley… it was a free-for-all. But it later took on an ethnic 
dimension when people aligned with their kind to defend themselves.’ 
1 There have been successive poor rains since 1998, according to the Kenya Food Security 
Steering Group’s Kenya Short Rains Assessment Report 2005, Nairobi, 9 February 2006.
 
The lack of rain resulted in drought and hunger in West Africa the first months of 2006. In 
Mandera in the north of Kenya the situation got serious. Dead animals were lying all over the 
ground where there used to be fields. Now there’s just sand and stones, and nothing to eat. 
Photo: Norwegian Church Aid/Kirsten Engebak
Over the next 40 days, there were another four violent incidents that left at least 
two more people dead, according to government officials. More than 3,000 
animals – pastoral communities’ only assets – were stolen. 
Arkan Athan Hussein, a lanky 18-year-old herder, was injured in one of the inci-
dents while tending his family’s livestock. His friend, Abdi Maalim, was killed. 
‘Six armed people emerged from nowhere. They wanted us to help them drive 
their livestock to the watering point. We couldn’t do that. The use of boreholes is 
restricted so we couldn’t push through someone else’s herds.’ 
‘As we resisted, one of them raised his AK-47 and shot Abdi in the chest and 
shoulder. As I fled, they shot at me.’ 
Arkan’s father, 70-year-old Ibrahim Hussein, says that in the 40 years he has 
been coming to Sambarwawa, this is the first time there has been such violence. 
In response, the authorities have set up a police post manned by 12 specially-
trained officers. But the area remains tense. The link between drought and 
conflict is widely recognised in Kenya. 
Edwin Rutto of the Africa Peace Forum monitors violent incidents in the country. 
He says that there is an ‘established correlation between drought and violent 
conflict… During times of drought, conflict between communities over water and 
pastures increases.’ 
It is a view echoed by Professor Richard Odingo, vicechairman of the UK’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), who has published work on 
drought-related conflict in north-eastern Kenya.
‘During a period of drought, the strongest survive,’ he says. ‘It’s survival of the 
fittest. You have a lot of conflict because of that. It is related to the struggle for 
resources, especially water and grazing.’ As the climate changes, say experts 
that Christian Aid interviewed, this is certain to get worse.
Recent drought has also triggered violence between communities in Naivasha’s 
Mai Mahiu area, 90 km north-west of Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. In January and 
February 2005, 22 people were killed and more than a dozen hospitalised in 
fighting over a water point on Ewaso Kedong river. When farmers diverted water 
to irrigate their farms, Maasai pastoralists living downstream illegally occupied 
their land, stole livestock and destroyed waterpipes in protest.
The Maasai were desperate for water because Kajiado district, where they live, 
had received less than 20 per cent of its usual rainfall during 2004 and 20052. 
The violence took on an ethnic dimension, as gangs from different tribes staged 
revenge attacks, pulling Maasai passengers out of buses and killing them with 
machetes, spears and arrows. 
2 USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System, cited in M Mutua, ‘Mai Mahiu: Maasai leaders 
protest at killings’, East African Standard, Nairobi, 25 February 2005.
Conflict over access to water, grazing and land has resulted in extreme violence 
between Borana and Gabra pastoralists in Kenya’s Marsabit district, near the 
Ethiopian border. On 12 July 2005, 56 people, including 22 primary school 
children, were killed in Turbi village. Another 20 people died in revenge attacks 
as Borana passengers were pulled from buses and murdered.
The problem has even begun to cross international borders, raising the 
fearsome spectre of war. In recent weeks, drought has caused conflict between 
Ugandan and Kenyan pastoralists. And Ethiopian troops have moved into parts of 
northern Somalia to stop Somalis crossing the border in search of pasture and 
water for their livestock. 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
As part of his work for the IPCC, Richard Odingo has been monitoring climate 
change in Africa. ‘We have rather frightening evidence. If you go back 50 years, 
climate is changing and is changing fairly rapidly for the worse,’ he says. 
The melting of the glaciers on Mount Kenya provides the clearest evidence of 
climate change. ‘The glaciers on Mount Kenya have always been there,’ he says. 
‘They have fluctuated during periods of drought. They have come back during 
periods of heavy rain. But for the first time we are seeing almost the 
disappearance of the glaciers.’ 
Professor Eric Odada, the regional director for climate change research in Africa 
at the Paris-based International Council for Science, argues that the melting of 
the glaciers on Mount Kilimanjaro, just across Kenya’s southern border with 
Tanzania, will have further devastating implications for some ofKenya’s most 
fertile lands. They provide the source for manylocal rivers, but they are 
disappearing. Professor Odada warns that rain-fed lakes will dry up, hitting 
some of the most populated parts of east Africa.
‘Cities like Mombasa [Kenya’s second largest city] will be put in a difficult 
situation because [it] is getting water from Mzima Springs which is fed by the 
glaciers on Mount Kilimanjaro,’ he says. 
The rapidity with which glaciers are melting shows that Kenya is getting warmer. 
This is confirmed by measurements on the ground. For example, the maximum 
temperature in Kericho, a highland area in the Rift Valley province where most of 
Kenya’s tea exports are grown, has increased by 3.5°C during the past 20 years3. 
In Lamu, on Kenya’s north-eastern coast near Somalia, the maximum 
temperature has increased by more than 3°C since the 1940s4. 
3 S Wandiga, ‘Assessment of Impact and Adaptation to Climate Change’, AIACC Regional Workshop, 
Dakar, 23 March 2004.
4 Kinguyu and Ogallo (1999) cited in Coping with Floods in Kenya, DCMN-UNEP report, Nairobi, April 
2004.
Peter Ambenje, head of forecasting at Kenya Meteorological Department, says: 
‘There seems to be increased frequency and intensity of severe weather and 
extreme climate events. Just by looking at rainfall patterns for the last 25 
years… severe drought… seem[s] to be becoming more prevalent. We can [also] 
see very high variability in rainfall.’ 
Dr Jesse Njoka of the University of Nairobi is an expert on the ecology of 
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands. His analysis backs up Ambenje’s 
observations. ‘The beginning and end of the rains are no longer that predicta-
ble,’ he explains.‘Even drought within the rainy season is an issue. For example, 
we always expect rains to start at the end of March. Now they are predicted for 
April. We expected grass rains [rains which allow grass to grow] in the middle 
of February and now it appears the rains we had in March are grass rains.’ 
The implications are serious. Crops die during these prolonged dry spells and 
animals have no grass to feed on and perish. 
POVERTY AND CLIMATE 
In Kenya, where 56 per cent of the population live on less than US$ 2 a day, it is 
the poor who will be hardest hit by climate change. 
Pastoralists are among the poorest and least educated people in Kenya. They 
spend their lives traversing the arid and semi-arid lands that make up 80 per 
cent of the country, looking for water and pasture. Most of the herders in Sam-
barwawa have never stepped inside a classroom and cannot speak either of 
Kenya’s national languages, English or Swahili. 
With the recurring droughts brought by climate change, poor pastoralists are 
stuck in an ever-tightening 
poverty-trap. ‘After people go through a period of relative recovery, then 
another drought hits. People are living in a state of perpetual suffering,’ says 
Edwin Rutto of the Africa Peace Forum. 
If the climate cannot sustain you, then you tend to spend a lifetime careering 
from crisis to crisis, periodically relying on emergency aid. This is undermining 
the government’s development efforts. ‘It is extremely expensive to feed people. 
The government has diverted all its development money to emergency money,’ 
says Fatuma Abdikadir, national coordinator of the government’s Arid Lands 
Resource Management Project.
People are left with very few choices when drought strikes – women and 
children fewest of all. As Dominic Kariuki of the peace-negotiating organisation 
Chemchemi Ya Ukweli puts it; You can’t sell your animals – you don’t have [any]. 
You can’t sell your labour – you don’t have skills. So you are left with your body.
’Prostitution has fast become not just the last but the only resort for many wo-
men and children – some as young as seven, according to Kariuki. 
He says: ‘They have lost their relatives. They are on their own. There is nobody 
to protect them. They come to work almost as slaves in urban centres where 
they work for food and nothing else. When those jobs are not available and they 
are getting used to urban life, they broaden their survival skills.’ 
WAR 
Prospects for the future are grim. Experts agree that conflict is likely to become 
more widespread, particularly as water shortages worsen. Cross-border 
conflict in the Horn of Africa, already existing on a small-scale, is likely to 
escalate.
Traditionally, young men in pastoralist groups attack their neighbours to steal 
their cattle. This is part of the culture of communities like the Turkana and 
Pokot from Kenya, the Karamajong from Uganda, Toposa from Sudan, Oromo 
and Merille from Ethiopia and numerous Somali clans. But these raids have 
become increasingly deadly in recent years with the influx of cheap guns from 
nearby war zones. Communities are becoming caught up in an endless cycle of 
revenge attacks. 
Nomads are used to crossing borders in search of scarce water and pasture. 
As drought tightens its grip on the region, the pressure to search for water is 
intensifying, leading to armed violence and deaths. In March, for example, 
Kenyan Pokots raided a Ugandan settlement, killing 16 people. In retaliation, 
the Ugandan army sent in a helicopter to pursue the Pokot raiders. 
Increasingly, soldiers are being used to protect communities, for example, 
around Soroti in eastern Uganda. A military response is one small step closer 
to state-backed conflict – or war. 
Water shortages could also lead to conflict between Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Kenya’s arid Turkana district, which borders Ethiopia, has only two sources of 
freshwater – the Turkwell and Omo rivers. The Turkwell, in Kenya, has been 
dammed to generate electricity, reducing its flow downstream. The Omo 
originates in the Ethiopian highlands. 
Professor Eric Odada of the International Council for Science, says: ‘On the 
Ethiopian side, they’re now diverting this water for irrigation and very little is 
coming into Lake Turkana. Turkana people are now very worried because [the 
river] is turning saline. The lake level has dropped by 60 metres over the last 
ten years.’ 
Another likely water war is over the River Nile which flows through Sudan to 
Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. Lake Victoria, in western Kenya, is one of 
its sources. Yet, under the rules of a treaty 
drawn up by British colonialists, Kenyans are 
not allowed to use the water for irrigation. 
Only Egypt, further downstream has this 
right.
Peace negotiator Dominic Kariuki says: ‘Due 
to that treaty, which was written without our 
consent, some people are dying of drought 
in Kenya. Conflict will explode as the water 
lessens. If it’s not worked out that we share 
the little that is there, then people will start 
fighting. It’s just a matter of time.’ 
Experts are increasingly concerned about the 
widening impacts of climate change. Profes-
sor Eric Odada foresees a doomsday’ when 
‘there will be mass migrations by people 
from Africa in search of food’. 
‘Europe should be prepared,’ he says. 
‘We are either going to prosper together or perish together when climate 
change comes. They should not think that the barrier between Morocco and 
Spain will stop people from the south moving into Europe.’
In the northeast of 
Kenya are lack of food 
and water threatening 
3,5 million people. 
Maryan Hussein Salat 
(15) wishes most of all 
an education, but the 
drought has killed all 
their animals and she 
can’t afford to go to 
school. Now she has 
to walk a long distance 
to bring water to her 
family. 
Photo: Norwegian 
Church Aid/Hege Opseth
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BANGLADESH: 
EROSION AND FLOOD
“Of course I am worried about the future for those who live and work on our coastlines. 
There is a disaster coming and all that we can do is try to make people better able to cope.”
Dr M Rafique Islam of the Bangladesh Intergovernmental Coastal Zone Management body
by Anjali Kwatra, Christian Aid
Begum’s eyes well with tears as she describes how desperate poverty forced 
her to send her nine-year-old daughter to work as a servant in a strange city 
hundreds of miles away. That was five years ago and Mazeda has only been 
able to see Shada Rani once a year since. “I think she is being well looked after 
and she is getting enough to eat, which is more than I could provide for her,” 
she says as she sits on the ground in the shade of a banyan tree. Mazeda, 35, 
had spent her whole life in Balashighat, a village in the Gaibandha district of 
northern Bangladesh, until the river Tista began to erode the land she lived on. 
For three years in a row, she and her husband and three children were forced 
to abandon their house and build a new shelter further back from the  
crumbling riverbank. Then, in 2000, the river finally swallowed all that 
remained of their small plot of farmland. Saving only what they could carry, 
the family had to flee by boat to a raised embankment a kilometre away, built 
by the government to protect a nearby town from floods. 
Mazeda Begum, 35, from northern Bangladesh, stands in front of her home on a raised 
flood-protection embankment. She sent her nine year-old daughter to the capital Dhaka 
to work as a servant, as the family could not afford to feed her after they lost their home 
and land six years ago because of river erosion.
Photo: Christian Aid/Anjali Kwatra
BANGLADESH: 
EROSION AND FLOOD
Dr M Rafique Islam of the Bangladesh Intergovernmental Coastal Zone Management body
Ever since, they have lived on the seven-metre high, five metres wide embank-
ment which winds through waterlogged paddy fields, camping alongside 200 
other families who also lost their homes to river erosion. For the first few days 
after they arrived they sheltered under a tree, using plastic sheets to keep off 
the heavy rain. A few weeks later Mazeda’s husband built a house with palm 
leaves and straw. But without their land, where they used to grow wheat, rice 
and jute, they had no way of earning an income. So Mazeda decided to send 
Shada Rani to Dhaka. “I had no choice but to send her as we could not afford to 
feed the whole family,” she says. “I did the right thing for her.”
COPING WITH EROSION
River erosion and flooding are part of everyday life in many areas of 
Bangladesh. Most of the 200 families on the embankment have moved two or 
three times because of erosion and some say they have had to move as many 
as ten or 11 times during their lives. They also say these events have become 
more common in the past few years. “Before, my father could predict how the 
river would change course over the years. But now it happens too fast for us to 
be able to predict,” Mazeda says. Surveys conducted in villages and rural areas 
show that people in Bangladesh are aware that their weather patterns are 
changing, even though they may not understand why, and many are 
worried. They are right to be. Bangladesh will be one of the countries hit 
hardest by climate change. More frequent floods, erosion and rising sea levels 
could reduce its landmass by more than a fifth, forcing millions of people to 
leave their homes and migrate in search of food, water and shelter1. Climate 
change could also cause droughts in some parts of the country and lead to 
more and stronger cyclones.
The Tista is one of 230 rivers that criss-cross the country. Further downstream 
it becomes the Brahmaputra, one of three great rivers – the others are the 
Ganges and the Meghna – which together drain 175 million hectares of land2. 
The outflow of water from Bangladesh is the third highest in the world after 
the Amazon and Congo systems. Although it is only the size of Greece, as much 
water flows through the country as through the whole of Europe. And with more 
than 140 million people, Bangladesh is among the most densely populated 
agricultural nations in the world. People must use every available piece of fer-
tile land, including riverbanks – where they are at greater risk from flooding. 
Each year during the monsoon season, which runs from July to September, 
roughly a fifth of the country is flooded. People have become used to coping 
with the inundation. In fact they welcome this regular flooding as it deposits 
essential nutrients on the soil, allowing them to grow crops year after year. 
1  World Bank, 2000, “Bangladesh: Climate change and sustainable development”
2 Leahy, Stephen, 2003, “Rising rivers set to wreck Bangladesh”, New Scientist
River erosion is also a natural process caused by the scouring action of the 
water as it flows downstream. Also, as floodwaters recede, the riverbank often 
breaks up and tens of metres of land can be washed downstream. At the same 
time deposits of silt can create new land, which is particularly vulnerable to 
erosion. Although flooding and erosion are nothing new to the people of 
Bangladesh, the past 20 years have seen the incidences of both intensify. 
In 1987, 1988, 1995, 1998 and 2004, severe floods left vast swathes (more than 
two-thirds in 1988 and 1998) of the country under water. The 2004 floods 
destroyed 80 per cent of the country’s crops, killed 747 people and left 
30 million homeless or stranded3.  
A good number of scientists and non-governmental organisations working with 
flood and river-erosion victims are certain that climate change is increasing 
the frequency of floods and the speed of erosion. Others agree that weather 
patterns are changing but are more circumspect about drawing a direct link 
between climate change and more erosion or floods. “We simply do not know 
if climate change is definitely increasing the erosion by our rivers. There are 
many complex factors involved,” says Dr Atiq Rahman, executive director of the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), the country’s leading envi-
ronmental research group. But, he adds, “what we can say is that patterns of 
rainfall and flooding have changed in the past few years. Severe floods used to 
come once every 20 years, but now seem to occur around every five to seven 
years. This could very well be linked with climate change.” 
3 Asian Development Bank, 2004, “Bangladesh; 2004 floods, Response, 
Damage and Recovery needs”
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But while the debate continues over whether Bangladesh is already feeling the 
effects of climate change, the forecast of what is to come for the country is 
indisputably dire.
PREDICTIONS
Climate models developed by the IPCC indicate that Bangladesh could expe-
rience ten to 15 per cent more rainfall by 20304. This heavier rainfall will flood 
between 20 and 40 per cent more land than today, according to Monirul Qader 
Mirza, a Bangladeshi water-resources expert within the University of Toronto’s 
Adaptation and Impacts Research Group5. This flooding will be exacerbated as 
increasing global temperatures melt more snow in the Himalayan mountains in 
Nepal and India each summer. Already studies have shown that the Himalayan 
glaciers are retreating at a rate of about ten to 15 metres per year6.  The huge 
amount of water created runs into rivers, many of which eventually flow through 
Bangladesh on their way to the sea. At the same time higher sea levels and 
higher tidal surges caused by more intense cyclones – which are also predicted 
to become worse with climate change – will decrease the rate at which water is 
discharged into the sea. This ‘back-water effect’ means floodwater will continue 
to accumulate, inundating more parts of the country and increasing the depth 
and area of flooding in those places already affected. “Anything which increases 
the flow of water through the rivers – such as more rain, more glacial melt or 
higher sea levels – will cause more river erosion and more flooding,” says Dr 
Rahman from BCAS. “The amount of water coming from the Himalayas is huge 
and flows through the three main rivers which end in the Bay of Bengal. “When 
the sea level is higher, the flow of that water will be restricted and it will only 
be able to spread sideways which means more severe and prolonged floods. 
Bangladesh is already a flood-prone country but it will become much worse in 
future.”
However, eventually if the glaciers melt completely, runoff will decrease rather 
than increase, leading to water shortages rather than floods7. Nazmul 
Chowdhury, from UK-based development agency Practical Action, runs a project 
that helps Mazeda and those like her who have lost their land find permanent 
homes and new ways of earning a living. He is in no doubt that floods and river 
erosion are getting worse and that this is linked to climate change. “The inten-
sity of the floods is increasing year by year and the river erosion is happening 
much more in recent years,” he says. “Of course the people who are facing the 
brunt of this process are the villagers who are poor to start with. Now they are in 
an even more vulnerable situation. Forget about making poverty history. 
Climate change will make poverty permanent.” 
4 IPCC, 2001
5 Qader, M Monirul, R A Warrick, and N J Ericksen, 2003. “The Implications of Climate Change on 
Floods of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers in Bangladesh” 
6 World Wildlife Fund, 2005, “An Overview of Glaciers, Glacier Retreat, and Subsequent Impacts in 
Nepal, India and China”
7 Dr R K Pachauri and Dr Madan Shrestra, 2005
Flood victims get some support from the government. But those affected by 
river erosion get very little financial compensation, even if they permanently lose 
their home or land, according to Charles Sarkar of the Christian Commission for 
Development in Bangladesh (CCDB). “They have nowhere to go and end up living 
on relatives’ land or by the roadside or on embankments,” he says. 
CCDB estimates that each year a million people are displaced by river erosion, 
many permanently. But this would be nothing compared to the numbers who 
may have to migrate in the future. Experts have forecast that climate change 
could result in 150 million environmental refugees by 2050, including around 15 
million from Bangladesh8.
 
ENCROACHING SEAS
Most of Bangladesh is less than ten metres above sea level9. A rise in sea levels 
of between nine and 95 centimetres by the year 2100 – which is towards the top 
end of the IPCC’s predictions – would leave about 18 per cent (or 25,000 square 
kilometres) of Bangladesh under water10. About 35 million people live in the 
country’s coastal areas11 and many could be forced to migrate inland as sea 
levels rise. This will put pressure on non-coastal areas, where land is scarce and 
the population density already high – and where climate change could already be 
causing more flooding and erosion. 
Scientists also predict that global warming will increase the frequency and 
intensity of tropical storms. If the surface temperature of the sea rises, cyclones 
– which already hit Bangladesh regularly, with devastating consequences – are 
more likely to form.
The island of Kutubdia, just off the coast of the southern district of Cox’s Bazar, 
has shrunk by half in less than 50 years because of coastal erosion, according 
to the Coastal Association for Social Transformation (Coast) Trust. In 1959 it 
covered an area of 36 square kilometres, but in 2005 was just 18 square kilome-
tres, according to Coast, which has analysed maps from the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board. Much of the erosion happened as a result of a devastating 
cyclone in 1991, which killed 140,000 people across Bangladesh, including 22,000 
in Kutubdia. But erosion also occurs every year during the high monsoon tides. 
A government-built embankment has held off the erosion in recent years. But 
where the embankment does not exist or is broken, the sea continues to swallow 
up land. 
In June 2005, Pancha Bala saw her home broken apart by the waves. Sand 
covers the place where the house stood and where she used to sleep is now part 
of the beach. Pancha, 45, whose husband died of cancer a year ago, says that
8 Myers,  Norman, 2003, “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World” 
9 World Bank, 2000, “Bangladesh: Climate change and sustainable development”
10  IBID
11 Anwar, Ali, 1999, “Vulnerability of Bangladesh coastal region to climate change with adaptation. 
when she moved into the bamboo house about quarter of a century ago, the sea 
was nearly 1km away. “I had lived in the house for many years. It was destroyed 
in the cyclone in 1991, but we rebuilt it on the same spot,” she recalls. “Over 
the years the sea was coming closer and closer, but in the end the waves took 
it in one night. The waves and rain started at ten in the morning. That first day, 
the kitchen was washed away. We thought we might drown, so we left.” She 
took her six children to her sister-in-law’s house further inland, but the final 
memories of her home still haunt her. “I didn’t sleep at all that night. The wind 
was howling and I could hear the roar of the sea. I was only thinking about the 
future and how we would live. When it became light I went outside and could 
not even see my house. The water covered it. I just sat and cried. Still I am 
angry with the sea for destroying my house.” 
There is anecdotal evidence that the rate of erosion has increased in Kutubdia 
in the past few years. The Coast trust estimates that if the erosion continues 
at the same rate, Kutubdia will vanish from the map completely in 70 years, 
forcing the remaining population of around 150,000 to find shelter and work 
elsewhere. Again, the factors involved in coastal erosion are complex. But if 
sea levels rise, tidal surges are likely to be stronger which increases the rate 
of erosion. “Over the last 20 years erosion has increased in coastal areas,” says 
Dr M Rafique Islam, leader of Intergovernmental Coastal Zone Management 
(ICZM), a body which advises the government on coastal issues. “Why exactly 
this is happening we are not sure, but certainly climate change is something 
that we believe is one of the factors. “As climate change gets worse, coastal 
erosion will get worse. Of course I am worried about the future for those who 
live and work on our coastlines. There is a disaster coming and all that we can 
do is try to make people better able to cope.” 
Work is already underway to mitigate the effects of climate change and help 
those at risk adapt. CCDB have for example built numerous multipurpose cyclone 
shelters in the country’s coastal areas and islands. They and other partners, 
including Gono Unnayan Prochesta, the Church of Bangladesh and UBINIG also 
build raised platforms to provide shelter for people and livestock during 
emergencies, and help communities diversify their crops and find alternative 
employment.
FAR FROM HOME
Although Pancha has only left Kutubdia twice in her life, she says she will soon 
have to move away from the island. “We cannot stay with my sister-in-law 
forever. We have no house, no land and no money,” she says. This year, 
Pancha’s 24-year-old son decided to move to Kutubdia Para, a slum area of 
Cox’s Bazar on the mainland. It is home to around 20,000 people from the 
island that lost their homes after the cyclone or because of erosion. 
Nur Hussain is among them. He left the island where his family had lived for 
generations, after losing his house. During the monsoon of July 2005, heavy 
rains and two-metre-high waves lashed the island. Within the space of 24 
hours, Nur’s house and the land it stood on had gone. “I did not know how 
my family would survive or where we would live. I was filled with despair. The 
sea had swallowed my home,” he says. The family stayed with relatives for six 
months until they made the hard decision to move to the mainland. “Kutubdia 
is my home, my motherland,” says Nur, “but I had to leave. Sometimes I cry 
for what I have lost.” Others are facing different problems that seem to point to 
climate change.
A rise in sea levels will enable saline water to intrude further inland during 
high tides and salt in the groundwater will increase, leaving fields near the 
coast useless for farming, according to Dr Rahman from BCAS. On Kutubdia 
and the mainland, there are signs that this is already happening. Saiful Islam 
used to grow rice on his farm near Moghnama village in Cox’s Bazar district. 
Gradually his rice production decreased until, eventually, the rice seedlings 
failed to grow at all because of the increased salinity of the land. “Now I 
cultivate salt because nothing else will grow,” he says as he scrapes his fresh 
‘crop’ across the plastic sheeting laid out over his fields, which are around 1.5 
km from the sea. “Salinity is increasing in land near the coast,” says ICZM’s 
Dr Islam. “Some people blame contamination for this – that as one person 
cultivates salt on their land, saline water will move into neighbouring fields. 
Contamination can be a localised issue, but that could not cause the big shifts 
that we are seeing now.” Mazeda, Pancha, Nur and Saiful have never heard of 
the terms climate change, global warming or carbon dioxide emissions. They 
have never even been in a car. But it is people like these – who are already the 
most vulnerable – that will be hardest hit by climate change. As Rezaul Karim 
Chowdhury, executive director of Coast, says, ‘It is the rich that cause climate 
change and it is the poor here in Bangladesh who will pay the price.’ 
By Kirsten Ulsrud and Siri Eriksen1
1. INTRODUCTION
It is no longer possible to ignore climate change adaptation as an element 
in development work as there is a serious danger that climate change in the 
form of more extreme droughts, floods and storms, sea level rise and more 
intense rainfalls will undermine development interventions, millennium de-
velopment goals and increase poverty (Schipper and Pelling 2006, IPCC 2007). 
Adaptation to climate change is the adjustment of practices, processes and 
structures to reduce the negative effects and take advantage of any opportuni-
ties associated with climate change. Although greenhouse gas emissions need 
1  Kirsten Ulsrud and Siri Eriksen, Department of Sociology and Human Geography University of 
Oslo, would like to thank Lars Otto Næss and Turid Hallstrøm for useful comments on an earlier 
draft of this chapter. The responsibility for views and any errors in this chapter rests with the 
authors, however.
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to be reduced to mitigate climate change and avoid future human suffering, 
adaptation to climate change is also necessary. We are already committed to 
some extent of human-induced climate change over the next decades because 
of past greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, societal changes such as 
privatisation of natural resources, declining health, and conflicts and insecurity 
are in some instances making populations increasingly vulnerable even to pre-
sent climatic variability such as seasonal droughts as well as extreme events. 
This is because these developments may have placed people’s livelihoods at the 
brink of collapse or undermined their existing adaptation strategies.
These same societal processes are likely to make populations equally, if not 
more, vulnerable to future climate changes. In this chapter, we focus on vulne-
rability to climatic variability and change since people who are vulnerable to cli-
matic variability are likely to be vulnerable to future changes, and since future 
changes in average conditions to a large extent will involve an intensification of 
present variability and extremes. Many serious problems have arisen because 
climate conditions and variability have been ignored in development projects, 
and many societies are not well adapted to their current climate, thereby even 
less prepared for additional climate change.
This chapter suggests that the issue of climate change should be treated as an 
issue of development which is relevant to all sectors of society since these all 
affect people’s vulnerability and their ability to adapt to climate variability and 
change. It should be noted that not all poor people are necessarily vulnerable, 
and non-poor people can also be vulnerable, in industrialised as well as in de-
veloping countries. In this chapter, we focus on the vulnerability of poor people 
in developing countries because of the specific challenges that they meet, and 
we highlight that adaptation to climate change among poor people will involve 
measures that differ from conventional poverty eradication measures. We sug-
gest that development and poverty eradication efforts need to make specific 
considerations of the vulnerability of their target groups and enhance the ability 
of these groups to adapt to climate variability and change. Poverty can thus be 
reduced in ways that may be more effective than the current strategies.
2. WHO IS VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND WHY? 
In order to identify the implications of climate change for poor people and 
poverty eradication strategies, it is important to understand the context of poor 
people’s lives. The social and ecological conditions within which people live 
influence the way they are affected by climate change. The causes of vulnerabi-
lity to climate change are therefore to a large extent societal and resulting from 
political and economical in addition to environmental processes. Social and 
ecological conditions that influence poor people’s lives and can make people 
vulnerable to climate change include lack of access to basic social services, 
loss of employment opportunities, lack of empowerment to participate in poli-
tical processes, violence and insecurity as well as environmental degradation 
and loss of access to important natural resources. Simply stated, the range of 
other challenges that people face besides climate influences the ways in which 
they can manage and adapt to climate related problems. This means that 
people are in a pre-existing or inherent state of vulnerability which can lead to 
severe negative effects (such as loss of lives and property, hunger and reduced 
health) when a particular change in climate conditions strikes. 
Since it is very dependent on the local context, the degree of vulnerability 
varies between individuals and social groups as well as over time. Some peo-
ple in areas that may experience relatively less dramatic physical changes in 
the climate can be more vulnerable to climate change than other people who 
experience more severe changes in the climate but for whom the social and 
ecological conditions are more favourable. There is little doubt that sea level 
rise leading to erosion and inundation of farmlands and settlements leads to 
some extreme effects of climate change. However, groups for whom incomes 
from farming and fishing have been steadily falling due to market conditions 
and ecological decline may feel equally severe effects when faced by a relati-
vely slight increases in the incidence of droughts or ocean temperatures. Poor 
people differ in their vulnerability because they differ in their livelihood strate-
gies, social and political relations, and the types of stressors to which they are 
exposed, and they differ in their attempts and capacity to adapt to changing 
conditions (Coetze 2002). 
It can therefore be misleading to describe whole regions as particularly 
vulnerable to climate change. For example, Africa is described as very vulner-
able to climate change because of a high dependence on natural resources 
and because large poor populations live in marginal (drought or flood-prone) 
climates. In addition, many African countries’ capacity to adapt to climate 
change is said to be limited by a lack of resources, poor institutions and inade-
quate infrastructure (Smith et al. 2003). There is no doubt that many people in 
Africa are vulnerable. In specific, many poor people are vulnerable to climate 
change, and droughts or floods can indeed force individuals and families into 
destitution (Lind and Eriksen 2006). However, rather than categorising all poor 
countries and all poor people as vulnerable, it is more useful to focus on which 
specific populations are vulnerable and why they are vulnerable. For example, 
people outside the most flood or drought prone areas can be very vulnerable, 
including urban populations in informal settlements (Bull-Kamanga et al. 
2003), and in Mozambique, it was found that in some villages, the relatively 
richer households were the most vulnerable to the 2000 floods (Brouwer and 
Nhassengo 2006). 
Table 1 exemplifies groups that, due to different social and ecological condi-
tions, are vulnerable to climate variability and change. Why, for example, are 
some parts of urban populations especially vulnerable? First, all urban 
inhabitants are more or less vulnerable to extreme heat and following disease 
Table 1. Exemplification of vulnerable groups
Vulnerable group                                Vulnerability context
Insufficient income and market access to be able to 
re-invest in equipment and fish other species or in other 
areas, poor rights to ensure their own interests in com-
petition with irrigation agriculture
Pastoralists with declining herds and incomes are 
vulnerable to drought and will be severely impacted 
by any increased incidence of drought and changing 
seasonality due to climate change
Insecurity, lack of government services, policies discoura-
ging pastoralism, reduced access to drought grazing and 
water resources, conversion of grazing land into private 
farmland and ranches 
Pastoralists with large herds in insecure areas are 
vulnerable to drought because seasonal grazing 
areas are unsafe and because conflict may decimate 
herds 
Raids and thefts leading to loss of livestock and key grazing 
areas being unsafe, inadequate veterinary services making 
herds prone to disease, droughts, conversion of grazing 
land into private farmland and ranches
Small-scale farmers with no formal employment, 
especially women, are vulnerable to drought, floods, 
changing seasonality, melting glaciers threatening 
future water supplies as well as increased incidence 
of malaria and infectious diseases related to climate 
change
Poor land rights, little household labour, fluctuating prices 
for farm products, rising costs of farm inputs, little political 
influence, reorganization of water sector  leading to loss 
of traditional water rights for small-scale irrigators, dif-
ficult to afford water fees, lack of access to useful farming 
techniques from relevant experiences in other places 
Farmers  in low-lying areas with little alternative 
land in higher areas or other income options may be 
vulnerable to sea level rise and salt water intrusion
Inability to access new land elsewhere or invest in al-
ternative livelihoods when farmland is lost, low incomes 
in the informal sector, poor conditions in nearby slums, 
weakening social networks and declining assistance from 
relatives
Urban poor in informal settlements are vulnerable 
to flooding, flash rains, sea level rise and infectious 
diseases, all of which may intensify under climate 
change
Inadequate water, roads and sanitation infrastructure, few 
and inadequate disaster management polices, housing 
in areas prone to floods and landslides, high exposure 
to health problems, only casual employment, high living 
expenses, lack of simple water harvesting and storing 
devices 
Orphans and old caring for orphans are vulnerable 
to droughts, floods, cyclones, increased incidence of 
malaria and infectious diseases
Lack of income, spread of HIV/AIDS, little household labour, 
loss of knowledge regarding adaptation strategies, lack of 
education, hunger, illness, destitution
Local inhabitants in areas affected by hydro-power 
projects are vulnerable to droughts and changing 
seasonality as livelihood options dwindle 
Water diverted from side rivers, reduced access to 
pasture and forest products, relocation, loss of land and 
livelihoods
Small-scale farmers with few assets and deterio-
rating access to natural resources are vulnerable to 
drought, floods, changing seasonality, as well as in-
creased incidence of malaria and infectious diseases 
related to climate change
Degraded ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, loss of natural 
resources, land rights and valuable trees, leading to lack 
of materials for handicraft and housing, lack of wild foods, 
fodder for animals, gardening plots, water for drinking, 
watering gardens and animals, opportunities for fishing, 
wood for cooking, increased risk of landslides, reduced 
protection against natural disasters
Unskilled urban workers are vulnerable to floods 
and intense rainfall that disrupt infrastructure, make 
it difficult to get to work and make living conditions 
difficult
Heavily polluted air and water, increasing health pro-
blems, declining numbers of formal jobs, weakening 
workers’ rights
Small-scale fishers may be vulnerable to cyclones 
and loss of equipment, changing sea temperatures 
and fish stocks as well as drying up of freshwater 
lakes due to increased temperatures and increased 
extraction of water for irrigation
and deaths, as well as other types of extreme weather. Second, people living in 
informal settlements, such as the 2 million people living in slums in Nairobi, are 
in situations characterised by lacking or inadequate infrastructure for water, 
roads and sanitation, high exposure to health problems, only casual employ-
ment, high living expenses, and lack of simple techniques for water harvesting 
or organic toilet techniques (for composting of sewage) (Weru and Bodewes 
2001). When flash rains, droughts, storms and extreme temperatures hit, as they 
increasingly do in this region, they will have more devastating consequences on 
the livelihoods, health and well-being of most of these people, compared to an 
imagined situation where they were not loaded by serious problems in the first 
hand. Many among the urban poor are also in an especially vulnerable 
situation because of heavily polluted air and water, seriously affecting their 
health. Furthermore, in box 1 below, the vulnerability of pastoralists in the rural 
drylands of Kenya is explained, illustrating the diversity of societal factors 
influencing the outcomes of severe droughts for poor people. 
Despite the high vulnerability to climate change among many groups of poor 
people, it is important to be aware of the distinction between poverty and vulner-
ability since development measures commonly used in order to reduce poverty 
do not necessarily reduce vulnerability to climate challenges. There are even 
well-documented cases of projects aimed at reducing poverty that have 
increased vulnerability to difficult climate conditions. Economic growth and 
technological change does not necessarily reduce vulnerability to climate 
variability and change, and can increase it. For example, the conversion of 
mangroves into shrimp farms may generate economic gains but leave coastal 
communities more vulnerable to coastal hazards such as storm surges (Adger 
et al. 2003; Klein et al. forthcoming).
Important causes of vulnerability to climate change, such as limited labour avail-
ability in women-headed households during drought, reduced access to specific 
drought resources such as shallow wells or forest products, or increased reliance 
on drought-sensitive crops, may be ignored in an approach that only focuses on 
poverty. Therefore, making some technological adjustments for extreme weather 
conditions, with the expectation that general poverty reduction will automatically 
reduce vulnerability to climate change is not sufficient. On the contrary, climate 
change adaptation should be addressed more broadly, through three types of 
measures. First, the efforts should reduce the direct risks of climate change, for 
example storms or flooding, to people’s strategies to secure their material and 
non-material needs. Second, the ways that poor people cope with climate stresses 
in the short term and adapt their livelihood systems in the long term should be 
understood, facilitated and the opportunities broadened. Finally, the specific social 
and environmental factors and changes leading to inability to cope or adapt should 
be understood and addressed. In this way “sustainable adaptation measures” can 
be achieved, by reducing both poverty and vulnerability to climate variability and 
change at the same time (Eriksen et al. 2007). 
Box 1: 
The relationship between poverty and vulnerability to climate variability 
and change in the drylands of Kenya
The relationship between poverty and vulnerability to climate related challenges 
is illustrated by the case of vulnerability among populations in drylands in Kenya 
(Eriksen et al. 2006a). Their current vulnerability to drought is instructive also to 
vulnerability to climate change. Drought has occurred from time to time in these 
areas and is not a phenomenon only related to climate change. However there is 
now evidence that droughts are increasing in African drylands and may increase 
further with climate change (IPCC 2007). Furthermore, factors that undermine 
current adaptation to drought are likely to cause vulnerability to any future chan-
ges in the climate, including an increase in drought or incidence in new types of 
events such as change in seasonality. In the research project conducted in Kenyan 
drylands, it was found that several processes had led to people being vulnerable 
to drought. Conflict and insecurity, loss of farmland through government gazett-
ment, poor provision of public services and water provision, increasing economic 
inequalities and weak social and political relations in formal and informal insti-
tutions were processes that had led to certain households and individuals in Kitui 
District being unable to access coping strategies during drought. The impact of 
drought, in particular in combination with conflict, had pushed some people into 
destitution and extreme poverty. In Turkana District, raids and insecurity, gradual 
conversion from nomadic pastoralism to settled farming or fishing, and drought, 
had made some people extremely poor. At the same time, it was not necessarily 
the poorest that had been the most vulnerable to these events. Both in Kitui and 
Turkana, some of the richer livestock owners had been targeted by raids; eviction 
from government lands and migration to areas safe from conflict led to loss of 
access to dry season grazing and farm-lands for both rich and poor households; 
while some individuals from poorer households in Kitui had successfully started 
trading businesses that gave high drought incomes. Many of the destitute were 
unable to access opportunities from aid interventions, however, because such 
adaptations, such as planting new types of seeds, were premised on a minimum 
of capital investment and access to land and labour. The destitute would therefore 
need particular measures, such as social welfare measures as well as facilitation 
of participation in drought economic activities such as processing of local drought-
resistant fruits, in order to adapt to climate change.
3. THE MAIN CLIMATIC CHANGE CHALLENGES 
FACED BY POOR POPULATIONS 
The latest report from United Nations expert group on climate change, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), concludes that it is very 
likely that most of the increase in temperatures over the past decades is due to 
human emissions of greenhouse gases. Changes in weather patterns related to 
this increase in global average temperatures have already been observed (IPCC 
2007). Mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined all over the world. The 
warming of oceans and the melting of glaciers have together contributed to sea 
level rise. Precipitation has increased significantly in northern and central 
Asia while in the Sahel, southern Africa and parts of southern Asia, drying has 
been observed. In fact, more intense and longer droughts have been observed 
since the 1970s, particularly in the tropics and subtropics, influenced by higher 
temperatures and decreased precipitation. Heavy rainfall events have become 
more frequent, and hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have also become 
more frequent. With further increases in global temperatures of 1.1 to 6.4˚C 
in this century, many of these trends are expected to continue. It is very likely 
(more than 95% likely) that hot extremes, heat waves, droughts and heavy pre-
cipitation events will continue to become more frequent. It is likely that future 
tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will become more intense, with 
larger peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation. The global sea level 
is expected to increase between 19 and 58 cm this century, mostly caused by 
warming of sea water (IPCC 2007). 
Changes in global average climate conditions will manifest themselves in very 
different ways locally. Specific regional and local predictions are still difficult 
for climate experts to provide. One of the most critical uncertainties is the 
problem of predicting the effects of climate change on either the Asian 
monsoon or the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which have great 
influence in east Asia, Latin America and southern and eastern Africa (Watson 
1997, Mc Carthy et al. 2001). Nevertheless, there is little doubt that in 
sub-Saharan Africa, prolonged droughts represent an already observed and 
increasing challenge, along with other climate related risks like increased 
intensity of precipitation events, sea level rise and salt water intrusion. Other 
climatic events that are likely to increase in some areas of Africa with climate 
change include floods and resulting landslides, extreme storm events and 
tidal waves, reduced runoff and increased water stress. Some of the 
consequences are disruption of water dependent activities, reduced 
hydropower production, threats to arid and semi-arid ecosystems, and 
increased incidences of vector-borne diseases and reduced nutritional status 
(Joubert and Hewitson 1997, Hulme et al. 2001, Tyson et al. 2002). A warming 
may also lead to significant changes in forest and rangeland cover.
In Asia, sea level rise is a critical issue for large populations in coastal areas 
and islands. Inhabitants living on low-lying coastal plains are also at risk from 
floods, and displacement from the coastal zone. Rising temperatures in the 
region are likely to continue with global warming, becoming more pronounced 
in arid and semi-arid regions than in coastal areas (Watson et al. 1997; 
McCarthy et al. 2001). The effect on future rainfall is uncertain, but future 
climate change could have a profound impact on the monsoon, which under-
pins the rainfall regime. Melting of glaciers, with potentially dramatic conse-
quences for downstream hydrology, ecology and human activities, as well as 
decrease in water supply, are other critical threats associated with climate 
change. In addition, droughts, cyclones and intense rainfall events, saltwater 
intrusion, and erosion are likely to continue to increase (Lebel 2002; IPCC 2007). 
Different areas of Latin America are expected to experience increased droughts, 
increased floods and resulting landslides, heat outbreaks, forest fires and loss 
of coastal land and biodiversity. Mountain regions and plateaus play an 
important role in maintaining the continent’s climate, and warming will affect 
the hydrological cycle and biodiversity, ecosystem shifts and the melting of 
glaciers. Glaciers are melting at an accelerated rate in the Venezuelan and 
Peruvian Andes. Rainfall may increase in some areas of the continent, such as 
north western parts (McCarthy et al. 2001). Climate change could have 
important implications for natural ecosystems (e.g. rangelands, wetlands), 
water resources, coastal zones, agriculture, and human health. Temperate 
grasslands will be negatively affected by drought, in which case livestock 
production is projected to drop dramatically. The combined effects of 
deforestation, fragmentation of habitats and climate change potentially pose a 
threat to the biodiversity of the region.
In all the three regions, damages to infrastructure and settlements, increased 
malnutrition, and increased geographic distribution of vector-borne diseases 
are among the risks that may increase with climate change. Shantytowns are at 
risk from floods and landslides, and sea level rise represents a threat through 
saltwater intrusion and coastal erosion. For example in the coastal nations of 
west, central and southeast Africa, coastal erosion is expected to steal land 
from settlements, cities and economic activities (McCarthy et al. 2001). The 
speed of change, as well as any increase in the unpredictability of weather pat-
terns or frequency of extreme events, may pose the greatest demands on the 
capacity of people and communities to make adjustments. As mentioned 
earlier, a number of social and ecological conditions have made many 
individuals and groups vulnerable to current climate variability and future 
change. Some of the central challenges that may worsen under climate change 
are found within the three fields of water supply, agriculture and income 
generation, and health. 
Water supply and drought
More than one billion people lack access to safe and affordable water. As 
highlighted in the Human Development report 2006, the global water crisis is 
not first and foremost about absolute shortages of physical supply. The report 
argues that the roots of the water crisis can be traced to poverty, inequality and 
unequal power relationships, as well as mistaken water management policies 
that exacerbate scarcity (UNDP 2006). Nevertheless, 19 countries are 
classified as water stressed, and more of these are in Africa than in any other 
region (Watson 1997). Water stress is likely to increase regardless of climate 
change, due to increases in demand from agriculture, industry and domestic 
Flooding of road and farms after intense rain is likely to become an even more common feature 
under future climate change. Access to diverse plots at different altitude and distance from the 
river is important to current local adaptation to variable climate conditions. 
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use, degradation of watersheds caused by land-use change, and siltation of 
river basins. As climate change exacerbates water stress, it reveals the 
importance of the underlying water management problems, and underlines 
the urgency of addressing them. This means that on the one hand, water 
problems can be solved by addressing social issues, but on the other hand, the 
challenges of water supply increase with climate change, and put even higher 
pressure on society for addressing the problems in fruitful ways. 
Although the effects of warming of global temperatures on precipitation are 
difficult to predict, current observed trends and scientific knowledge leave 
little doubt that some areas already severely affected by drought will 
experi-ence further reduction of rainfall and increased temperatures which 
will exacerbate drying (IPCC 2007). Changes to the timing of rainy seasons, 
making them more difficult to predict and more rainfall coming in intense 
episodes, means that it may become more difficult to make use of water 
resources in rain-fed agriculture, hydropower and water supply systems. 
In Nepal, rising temperatures have increased glacial retreat and glacial lake 
outburst floods, which reduce the availability of water and hydropower energy 
(OECD 2003). Extreme events strain people’s capacity to cope with subsequent 
Village water pipes for domestic supply are critical for securing a decent life under current 
climate variability, and even more so under future climate change and increased risk of 
droughts. In addition to satisfying domestic water needs during drought and freeing up hou-
sehold work time, equitable access to water for poor people is important to be able to engage 
in alternative non-farm economic activities such as small scale business and reduce their 
vulnerability to future climate change.
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events, exemplified by the recent flooding in parts of East Africa that arrived on 
the back of several dry years. Water scarcity, as well as flooding, tend to be as-
sociated with outbreaks of diarrhoea, malaria and other health problems both in 
rural an urban areas. Unclean water is already the world’s second biggest 
killer of children (UNDP 2006).  
The fact that women and young girls, especially among poor people, often have 
the main responsibility for collecting water for their families reinforces gender 
inequalities in employment and education (UNDP 2006). Droughts often disrupt 
piped water supply, and more frequent droughts due to climate change will 
increase the problem. However, lack of access to piped water in the first place 
affects many people both in the cities and in rural areas, who have to rely on 
other sources of water for consumption, feeding and watering animals and other 
economic activities. Local streams and rivers, ponds and shallow wells are 
common water sources in rural areas, while urban populations often have to buy 
water from traders, which often become more expensive or unreliable 
during drought. Rural water sources sometimes become more polluted or dry up 
completely, forcing people to trek long distances to access water (Eriksen 2005). 
Drought often only highlights a general marginalisation of drylands undermining 
local capacity to adapt, through a lack of government or aid investment in water 
infrastructure, lack of local incomes sufficient to drill private boreholes, as well 
as lack of local influence over development decisions. Inequality of 
access to water during drought also leads to vulnerability. Shallow wells may be 
privately owned by a few families, which means that other families have to pay 
or can only access wells after the owners have satisfied their needs. Economic 
liberalisation policies, such as privatisation of water resources or decreasing 
government expenses and services, have increased the cost and often made 
water inaccessible to poor people (Orindi and Murray 2005). While it is 
sometimes expected that increased drought will lead to conflicts over 
water resources, the opposite has also been observed at the local level, that 
is, drought leading to increased cooperation and trade over water resources 
(Eriksen et al. 2006b). 
It has been suggested that famines are in fact created mainly by economic and 
political processes, rather than climate-induced harvest failure. When incomes 
from production decline and basic goods that people have to buy become more 
expensive, it only takes a very small meteorological event to trigger a crisis (Sen 
1981). Famines are also often used politically, for example to buy political loy-
alties. Droughts are sometimes used to absolve government responsibility for 
poverty generated by lack of investment and government inaction, as droughts 
or floods are explained as ‘external’ factors for which no one could prepare. De-
mocratisation at the local level may increase local influence over water supply, 
as well as the accountability of governments in poverty eradication efforts. For 
the case of Kenya, Eriksen et al. (2006b) show that democratic election of water 
committees and other village committees, with representation of vulnerable 
groups, is critical to securing a stable water supply during drought.  
In addition to democratisation and economic processes, the case of Kenya 
shows that access to new technologies is critical to local adaptive capacity in 
the context of water supply and drought as well as climate change. People have 
always adapted to climatic variability and drought. Local technologies such 
as digging of shallow wells in dry river beds form the backbone of strategies 
to survive. However, a lack of further development of dryland technology is 
a cause of vulnerability. Sub-surface dams in seasonal rivers and water har-
vesting are cheap technologies that have been implemented in dryland areas in 
order to make better use of irregular rainfall. Access to water is critical not only 
for domestic consumption and hygiene, but also for economic activities inclu-
ding cattle rearing, business, brick making or small scale irrigated vegetable 
production that people often rely on when the harvest fails (Eriksen et al 2006b; 
Osbahr and Viner 2006). 
Agriculture and income generating activities
Climate change is likely to be a particular challenge for the agricultural sector 
and other income generating activities for rural populations, due to increased 
variability, heat stress, flooding and drought caused by climate change 
(McCarthy et al. 2001; IPCC  2007). The changes will reduce yields in many lo-
cations, for example in tropical Asia, while improving them in others. But even 
if the net effects are uncertain, there is little doubt that many areas will be 
adversely affected (McCarthy et al. 2001). Productive assets and 
infrastructure may be damaged by extreme weather events and floods can cut 
people off from markets. Although the role of farming in rural livelihoods 
appears to be declining (Rigg 2005), agriculture is an important source of 
income for many poor people. It is thus predicted that climate change and 
climate variability can increase poverty levels particularly in tropical regions 
(Mathur et al. 2004). In Africa, estimates indicate that nearly 60-70% of the 
population is dependent on the agriculture sector for employment. According 
to the IPCC (McCarthy et al. 2001), the overall economic impact of climate 
change on the agriculture sector could be (on average) up to 10% of the gross 
domestic products of the 40 of the poorest and most food insecure countries 
of the world – mostly in Africa. People who try to make a living in marginal 
areas are likely to be severely affected (Mathur et al. 2004). Farming in Africa 
is highly dependent on rainfed agri-culture, and increased droughts can seri-
ously impact the availability of food (Watson 1997).
Focus is often placed on the need for adjustments in climate sensitive econo-
mic activities, and people may shift cultivation and herding practices, farming 
new crops and grazing in new areas. But actual adaptation is less straight for-
ward than simple adjustments. For example, it has been observed that people 
often cannot make use of seasonal forecasts and climate information to make 
necessary adjustments to production due to a lack of capital and labour, ac-
cess to required inputs, and insufficient training (O’Brien and Vogel 2003). The 
strategies that people have developed to manage such climate variability must 
be strengthened. This means that adjustments that are required are 
multi-sectoral rather than pertaining to just one economic sector or activity. 
Even in rural areas, people normally rely on a number of different activities 
for food and income in addition to, for example, agriculture. Common for 
most groups of poor people, either urban workers, unemployed slum dwel-
lers, smallholders in agriculture, rural workers or pastoralists, are livelihoods 
based on multiple activities and diversification of sources of income and food 
(Chambers 1995, Hesselberg 1996, Ellis 1998). Poor people are also increas-
ingly living in several places and splitting up families, living both in rural and 
urban areas, moving between city employment, small-town work and 
agricultural labour, seasonally or more sporadically, in search for an income 
(Hesselberg 2005).  
The challenges posed by climate risk to people’s income generating activities 
are met by a range of different coping and adaptation strategies. This often 
involves increased multiactivity when households and individuals diversify into 
many activities in order to secure basic needs. Moreover, the need for coping 
and adaptation strategies often lead to reinforced need for access to com-
Shallow wells for domestic and livestock use are critical for survival of farming as well as 
nomadic pastoralist groups during drought. Drought time watering of livestock here provide 
opportunities for trade, suggesting that facilitating mobility and interaction between farming 
and nomadic pastoralist groups is critical to adapting to climate change.
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mon pool resources. The dependence and need for local, informal economic 
opportunities and remittances also increase. People report doing a number of 
tasks-for-cash to survive, such as producing charcoal, fetching water, collec-
ting and selling wild foods, fuel wood, seeds from trees, and construction poles, 
and participation on public workfare schemes. Multilocality and migration also 
characterise coping or climate adaptation, as people migrate to other rural or 
urban areas where casual labour is available. 
Diversification is no guarantee of successful adaptation in terms of securing 
basic needs in the face of climate variability or change, however. It has been 
observed that when a main activity such as agriculture fails, households try to 
specialise to another activity that can take its place as primary income source. 
However, most people lack either the skills, labour or capital necessary for 
such specialisation and instead resort to a range of opportunistic activities, 
including poultry sale, collecting wild foods and doing small scale business 
such as selling cakes. Adaptive capacity is therefore undermined by a lack of 
access to alternative income sources that yield a viable income, due to ex-
ploitative marketing arrangements, ecosystem degradation, decline in formal 
employment, and increase in HIV/AIDS and other health problems that restrict 
household capital and labour availability. Much of the infrastructure needed to 
start alternative income generating strategies, including electricity, water, and 
transport, is lacking, and there is a need for developing marketing structures, 
as well as research, development and diffusion of value adding technologies. 
Facilitating multiple incomes and addressing the processes that weaken local 
adaptation mechanisms are critical to reducing vulnerability among poor 
people (as exemplified in the next section and in Table 2).
The pattern of diversification observed during the 2003 drought in two 
villages in Mozambique exemplifies that many diversification strategies become 
unviable as drought intensifies (Eriksen and Silva 2003). Although local trade 
had initially increased at the start of the drought, alternatives dwindled and the 
village economy more or less closed down. People resorted to sale of 
charcoal and other local products that involved engaging with outside and 
urban markets, but in relations that were highly exploitative. The poorer groups 
who could not afford to irrigate crops nor transport products to markets that 
offered good prices all resorted to similar activities, typically growing pumpkin 
leaves in river beds for consumption and sale in the local market, producing 
charcoal for informal trade and taking casual employment on commercial 
farms. These activities had marginal and decreasing returns with the 
increasing number of people engaging in them (Eriksen and Silva 2007). 
When faced with severe and prolonged climatic events, some of the most 
vulnerable people have to sell key productive assets such as land, livestock, 
farm tools, roof of the house or even resort to prostitution, thereby endange-
ring their livelihoods in the long term. In Bangladesh, during the floods in 1998, 
some of the affected households were able to use emergency food and change 
their employment away from agriculture. However, poorer households coped 
through reducing food consumption and through the sale of assets, reducing 
their resilience to future shocks. As a result of social or political restrictions, 
the poor may also be forced to remain in exposed areas (DFID 2004). Among 
vulnerable populations, many coping and crisis strategies become routine or 
permanent in such a situation. 
Health
Health is a fundamental issue to the vulnerability of the poor since it is both an 
element of quality of life and prerequisite for securing other aspects of a decent 
life, including material needs and social rights. Climate change is expected 
to lead to increasing incidence and extent of some vector borne diseases, like 
malaria, schistosomiasis, and dengue-fever. These are very sensitive to climate 
conditions and are likely to spread into new regions. Furthermore, waterborne 
and water-related infectious diseases like cholera are also expected to increase 
due to higher temperatures and higher humidity, interacting with other factors 
as increases in population, urbanisation rates, water quality declines, and other 
factors (Watson 1997, Garcia-Herrera et al. 2005; Watson et al. 2005) Climate 
change may also exacerbate air pollution, currently already a serious health 
problem in many cities. Extreme weather events, which may increase under 
climate change, already represent a health threat becase they lead to injuries, 
disabilities and deaths. Climate related loss of coastal resources, reduction in 
ecosystem productivity and decline in agricultural productivity can also have ne-
gative health impacts (ADB 2005). Heat stress can lead to mortality and inability 
to work, as observed during past severe events such as the 650 deaths that oc-
curred in Orissa in northern India in 1998 (McMichael et al. 2003, 
Greenpeace 20072 ). Drought and floods, which are increasing due to climate 
change, often lead to poor water supply, unsanitary conditions and the spread 
of disease. The concentrations of sewage waste and industrial effluents, can 
increase when water level drops in dams and rivers (Watson 1997). Ill health due 
to all problems mentioned above have far-reaching economic 
consequences, through decreased productivity and economic growth, reinforced 
inequalities and poverty (UNDP 2006)
Many people commonly lack access to formal health care, partly due to the poor 
coverage of health facilities. People try to manage health problems by seeking 
casual labour or selling assets to cover increased cash needs for hospital bills, 
using indigenous medicinal plants, and increased reliance on social networks to 
cover costs. Poor health, for example due to the spread of HIV/AIDS, increases 
vulnerability to climate change and was a major reason that the 2002 drought in 
southern Africa, which was not exceptional from a meteorological point of view, 
had such serious consequences. Due to the extra stress of HIV/AIDS and loss of 
household labour due to illness/death as well as need to care for the ill, traditio-
nal coping mechanisms in some families had to some extent broken down. There 
are now more children-headed households, who lack the skills and strength to 
cope with stress situations such as drought and floods. Indigenous knowledge 
regarding how to manage climatic variability is lost as the parent generation dies. 
When the immune system is already compromised, prolonged hunger can have 
far more drastic consequences than when a person is in good health. The weake-
ned health state of many poor people due to inadequate nutrition often leads to 
disease outbreaks during onset of rains after prolonged drought.  
The case of malaria illustrates that the most important reasons for high vulnera-
bility among many poor in terms of negative health effects from climate change 
are social rather than climatological in nature. Malaria can be eradicated through 
spraying and mosquito nets, and people can be cured through medicines 
regardless of any spread due to climate change, but poor households, and 
children in particular, often have no mosquito nets. In addition, poor are often 
unable to access or pay for adequate medical treatment during malaria epide-
mics. Malaria epidemics seriously affects adaptive capacity because many 
households sell their food crops to cover the cost of treatment, others borrow 
money or rely on remittances, while some resort to selling their land (Olago 
2005). These coping mechanisms may lead to an increase in food shortages, 
debts and material poverty. 
2   http://www.greenpeace.org/india/campaigns/choose-positive-energy/what-is-climate-change/climate-change-
its-possible
4. WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE LIMITS TO 
ADAPTATION AND EQUITY ISSUES
Climate change has been framed as an equity issue because poor people 
contribute negligibly to the problem, but are vulnerable and will be most 
adversely affected by climate change. Adaptation is in itself also an issue of 
equity because some adaptation measures, whilst reducing the vulnerability 
to climate change of some people, may unintentionally increase the vulnera-
bility of many others. For example, new coastal infrastructure could disturb 
the offshore sediment balance, resulting in erosion in nearby coastal areas. 
Constructing dams and irrigation infrastructure can benefit irrigation farmers 
and electricity consumers in cities, but is likely to increase the vulnerability of 
poor people evicted from farmland and resources that are critical to their own 
adaptive strategies. 
Adaptation is a political process since the support of a particular type of 
adaptation measure can favour one social group or area over another. 
Adaptation efforts can also have negative effects in the long term. Irrigation, 
though enabling harvests in the short term, can lead to the salinisation of soil 
and the degradation of wetlands, as well as reduced access to groundwater and 
productive land. Such maladaptation, which often affects those with little power 
and limited access to resources, could be avoided by seeking to understand the 
relevant social and environmental processes. 
Negative effects of climate change will furthermore be felt because there are 
limits to adaptation. For example, there may be physical changes, such as in 
frequency of flooding or extent of inundation due to sea level rise, that are so 
large that sufficient adjustments cannot be made. Other people may be unable 
to adapt due to social and structural limitations. Although options for adapta-
tion to climate change exist, it does not mean that every vulnerable community, 
sector or country can manage to adapt (Smit et al. 2000, Smith et al. 2003). 
Migration may be the only form of adaptation for many. The press has pointed 
out that ‘climate refugees’ in terms of tourists fleeing heat waves in southern 
Europe may seek cooler summers in Scandinavia. If this becomes the case, 
these are a privileged few who can pay for travel. The real climate refugees, 
however, are poor people who have to leave their farmland or homes due to 
floods, droughts or sea level rise, salt water intrusion and erosion, or fishers 
and pastoralists and other groups whose livelihoods become unviable. 
Experience from Mozambique and Bangladesh shows that the large majori-
ties of these refugees are, and are likely to continue to be, internally displaced 
people (Mallick et al. 2005; Lucio et al 2007). Developing countries already 
house millions of displaced people due to conflicts and natural disasters. Apart 
from a few who are housed in resettlement schemes, people who have left their 
home due to climatic stress normally end up in neighbouring villages or more 
marginal rural areas as landless destitutes with few productive assets or in 
urban informal settlements. Some migrate to neighbouring countries and are 
housed in refugee camps or work illegally in towns. Those who adapt to climate 
stress through migration therefore often end up with few economic and political 
rights, often losing their cultural and social affinity and security, as well as their 
sources of livelihoods, and may in turn become vulnerable to a wide range of 
stressors.
Climate change adaptation also has the potential to create “winners and 
losers”. Taking the Kenyan example described in Box 1, renting out wells to 
visiting groups of herders has become a new source of income for some people 
in Kitui, Kenya, while people who are not owners of wells find it increasingly dif-
ficult to access sufficient water and grazing for their cattle. But very few peo-
ple can be considered ‘winners’ in the context of frequent armed violence and 
drought. Instead, there are gradiations among those who are considered to be 
‘losers’ (Sharp et al. 2003, Lind & Eriksen 2006). 
It cannot be assumed that each and every adaptation measure automatically 
benefits the poor. Particular consideration should be given to how development 
action, unintentionally, may contribute to the creation of “losers” by worsening 
the vulnerability of certain individuals and groups in society. If, for example, new 
sources of livelihoods promoted by development agencies prove unreliable and 
people no longer have the traditional livelihoods to fall back on, the vulner-abi-
lity to climate change may increase. Furthermore, biased power structures can 
be reinforced by some types of adaptation measures, thereby increasing vulne-
rability of the poor. Vulnerable people are by definition not in powerful positions. 
It is necessary to find out how pro-poor adaptation can be effectively implemen-
ted despite power structures biased against the poor.
5. WHAT NEW MEASURES ARE NEEDED FOR POOR 
PEOPLE IN ORDER TO ADAPT?
As explained above, individuals and households employ strategies to adapt to 
climate change. In addition, the challenges of poor people in the face of climate 
change necessitate climate adaptation measures from central and local 
governments, development agencies and NGOs. Such interventions can make 
several considerations. Addressing climate risk, strengthening adaptive 
capacity, and targeting the factors making people vulnerable, represent what 
has to be done different in poverty eradication or development aid in order to 
strengthen adaptation to climate change among the poor. There is a potential 
for win-win solutions because climate change adaptation interventions can lead 
to improved ways of reducing poverty. The design and implementation of adap-
tation measures can also benefit from the experience of decades of develop-
ment work, including the realisation that measures targeting local needs are 
more likely to be successful than large-scale measures implemented through a 
top-down approach (Adger et al. 2003). 
Successful climate change adaptation interventions relate to very diverse 
vulnerability contexts and existing strategies. We here highlight three 
practical ways that climate change adaptation can add to development and 
poverty eradication efforts. These are examples of measures that can both 
reduce risk, enhance local adaptation strategies, and address vulnerability 
factors. First, we will focus on the need for sufficient understanding of experi-
ences and strategies of poor people and communities. Second we will suggest 
some potential measures of adaptation through improved management and 
innovative ways of utilising and maintaining local ecosystems. Third, we will 
attempt to illustrate the importance of removing structural and regulatory bar-
riers to the adaptation strategies of poor people. Table 2 summarises some of 
the practical adaptation measures that may be useful in different local contexts. 
In depth knowledge about local livelihoods is crucial for adaptation
The previous sections demonstrate that in order to identify how poor people can 
be supported in adaptation efforts, it is necessary to understand their liveli-
hoods and strategies to cope and adapt to climate change and other challenges. 
Although it is commonly understood that the livelihoods of the poor should be 
considered in development planning, there is still often a lack of understanding 
of the ways that people respond to new and evolving threats nor of local ways 
of sustainable natural resource use. Without this understanding, development 
interventions may worsen an already difficult situation. For example, in some 
areas, local varieties of seeds which are well adapted to local climate conditions 
are disappearing because of agricultural development projects 
(Orindi and Ochieng 2005). If based on sufficient interaction with affected 
populations and insights into their problems, strengths and potentials, however, 
interventions can improve local adaptation (Orindi and Murray 2005). Some of 
the coping measures developed by households and communities can only be of 
help in the short term and cannot deal with increased and more severe shocks. 
Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that many traditional strategies 
for coping with extreme climate events provide an important lesson for how 
society can better prepare and adapt to climate change in the long-term, and 
such strategies need to be strengthened. 
In the case of dryland populations, it should be considered how existing 
development initiatives can better target those who are most vulnerable to 
climate stress. For example, current economic structures encourage the 
spreading of “modernized”, but often precarious, farming systems into 
increasingly arid environments, to the detriment of supposedly “backward”, 
customary forms of pastoralism or forest uses. There is a need for incentives 
and structures to encourage the adoption of production systems that are 
adapted to climatic variations and change, such as pastoralism and investment 
in valuable trees in drylands. Creating and facilitating marketing outlets for 
processed forest products, provision of infrastructure including hospitals, 
schools, roads and decentralised watering points (through piping water into 
different areas) would lead to economic structures that are better adapted to 
climate change. In particular, such measures should be implemented 
simultaneously, in a coordinated way (Eriksen et al. 2006b). Such adaptation 
measures founded on in-depth knowledge about local knowledge systems and 
livelihoods, has the potential for sustainable reduction of vulnerability and in-
creased capacity to adapt to new challenges. Adaptation strategies to climate 
change in all the three sectors of water supply, income generating activities as 
well as health, can potentially be strengthened and maintained through such 
an approach.
The urban centres in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where three quarters 
of the world’s urban population live, contain a large proportion of the people 
most at risk from storms, floods, sea level rise and other climate-related im-
pacts. A third to half of the population in many cities in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America lack good provision of water and sanitation and live in informal and 
often illegal settlements. It needs to be considered how investments for 
adaptation to climate change can avoid undermining the housing and income 
generating strategies of poor people. By understanding the problems and 
needs of urban habitants living in very poor quality shelter (approximately 900 
million people), it is possible to find strategies for reducing risk to climate 
change that also have the potential to reduce other risks. For example, relo-
cation should be avoided wherever possible because it often leads to loss of 
income options. In stead, programmes can be implemented for upgrading cur-
rent settlements wherever possible. Such upgrading involves the government 
working with the inhabitants of the informal settlement areas to find solutions 
for improving infrastructure, for instance for water, sanitation, drainage, and 
support for house improvements, combined with lowering flooding risks. 
Where low-income groups must be moved from hazardous sites, coopera-
tion between the inhabitants and the government in deciding where to move 
and how to organise the move is important. Current policy making regarding 
informal settlements usually fail to take people’s experiences and strategies 
into account, as city governments tend to push inhabitants to peripheral areas, 
destroying their homes, asset base, social networks and their incomes (Sat-
terthwaite 2006). 
Adaptation through local and innovative ecosystem management 
Climate change makes it even more important than before to stimulate a 
type of economic and social development that is adapted to climate change. 
One example is to manage, maintain and strengthen ecosystems in ways that 
enhance ecosystem services and improve access by the poor to these services. 
An ecosystem is a community of interacting organisms and the physical envi-
ronment they live in; the forests, grasslands, wetlands, deserts, coral reefs, 
rivers, estuaries, and other living environments. They also include the farms, 
pastures, and rangelands – collectively known as agroecosystems. Ecosystem 
services are products obtained from ecosystems, like food, fresh water, fuel-
wood, fiber, biochemicals, and genetic resources. They also provide benefits 
obtained from regulation of ecosystem processes, like improved local climate 
conditions, disease regulation, water supply and water purification. Approxi-
mately 1.6 billion people are currently dependent on forests in some way. 
The full potential of ecosystems as a wealth-creating asset for the poor has 
yet to be effectively tapped (World Resources Institute 2005). It is therefore 
crucial to strengthen people’s opportunities for taking advantage of ecosystem 
services, both in traditional and new ways, in order to achieve economically, 
socially and climate resilient development. Such strategies can potentially 
reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity in key sectors such as 
water supply, agriculture and income generation, and health.
Social organisation and community management of natural resources are 
shown to play an important role for promoting sustainable management of 
natural resources in poor communities (World Recources Insitute 2005, 
Robledo and Forner 2005). It has also been pointed out that clarification of 
land tenure and land-use rights are key elements in promoting sustainable 
management, as well as facilitation from governments for improving access to 
markets for agricultural and other ecosystem products and providing relevant 
and timely market information. The state can also help by supporting small-
scale processing plants to diversify and add value to natural products, such as 
by making timber into furniture, and by removing burdensome regulations and 
other barriers to the establishment of local enterprises based on ecosystem 
products (World Resources Institute 2005).
Efforts to take advantage of the untapped potential for wealth creation by use 
of ecosystems can involve the use of environmental technologies adapted to 
local needs and conditions, which can reduce vulnerability and increase 
adaptive capacity of poor communities and people. Such technologies consist 
of practices that combine local and introduced knowledge, such as agro-
forestry, organic farming techniques, like mulching, terracing, planting of 
cover crops, improved ways of using animal manure and intrercropping 
(e.g. shade grown coffee). Water harvesting and decentralised energy 
supply are other techno-logical solution with a large untapped potential (Orindi 
and Murray 2005, Venema and Cisse 2004, Mathur et. al 2004). The sale of 
treadle powered water irrigation pumps in Kenya has surpassed 36.000, and 
is shown to substantially increase peri-urban and rural incomes, while 70% of 
the pumps are managed and controlled by women (Karekezi et al. 2005). Other 
measures are planting of valuable trees adapted to the climate and growing of 
oil-seeds, such as jatropha for biodiesel-production, which can be grown for 
fencing and in areas not suited for agriculture. Another emerging opportunity 
is to facilitate selling of millet for bio-ethanol production in addition to food 
markets). Millet is a drought crop and where new markets give a better price, 
purchasing power of farmers also increases. 
Renewable energy technologies, such as solar, biomass, wind and geothermal 
energy, which are treated in the next chapter of this report, are usually seen as 
climate change mitigation technologies, but are also highly relevant to sustain-
able economic and social development, included climate change adaptation. 
They make it possible to harvest rich natural resources like the sun, surplus 
biomass, wind, and geothermal energy. The diversity of new renewable energy 
technologies makes it possible to choose energy sources which are resilient to 
changes in local climate conditions. An implication is that in order to promote 
adaptation that is sensitive to local livelihoods, the widespread focus on large 
hydro projects should be replaced by a broader approach that increases the 
technological diversity of the energy sector. 
Box 2: Examples of local ecosystem management for enhanced adaptive 
capacity
Increased access to knowledge and experiences from other communities about sustainable 
practices for using ecosystems, such as through south-south transfer of experiences can 
enhance adaptive capacity. There is also an urgent need for governments to support such 
local measures to make ecosystems healthier and more resilient to climate variability and 
change (AfDB et al. 2003). An example of how improvements of ecosystems have reduced 
vulnerability is provided by the case of Machacos, Kenya. The area had extensive soil ero-
sion in the 1930s, believed to be caused by overpopulation. 60 years later, with a population 
that had increased five-fold, erosion was substantially reduced, due to measures 
implemented by local inhabitants, including terracing, use of various grasses to stabilise 
embankments, tree planting, manuring and soil management techniques. The increased 
number of people had made it possible to intensify and improve agricultural production. In 
addition to the changes in agricultural techniques, access to markets due to the relatively 
close distance to Nairobi played an important role in these changes (Tiffen et al. 1994, Ben-
jaminsen and Svarstad 1998). In areas in China where land is subject to severe land 
degradation, the government has recently undertaken integrated ecosystems mana-
gement. Eco-farming integrates renewable energy use such as solar power, vineyard 
cultivation, and legume planting for fixing sand and providing forage. In Vietnam, mangrove 
planting led to improved resilience of the local population to climatic extremes and provided 
livelihood opportunities through harvesting of shellfish among the mangroves. 
Table 2. Summary of practical examples of how climate change adaptation 
can add to development and poverty eradication efforts
Challenges weakening poor 
people’s  adaptation strategies  
Measures that may contribute to both 
adaptation and poverty reduction 
1) Development interventions inadequa-
tely taking account of poor peoples’ 
livelihoods and adaptation strategies
Imposition of external technologies, such 
as large scale water dams, spreading of 
‘modernized’ farming systems and seeds 
and exotic tree species into arid environ-
ments 
Measures to strengthen poor people’s 
livelihood and adaptation strategies
Support and develop local technologies, 
including shallow wells, sub-surface 
dams, water harvesting techniques, local 
seed varieties and planting of indigenous 
tree species. Support marketing of local 
products
Underutilisation of knowledge accumulated 
from adaptation to local climate conditions 
Little research infrastructure and support 
for adapted production systems such as 
nomadic pastoralism and indigenous tree 
products 
Isolated and large-scale infrastructure 
provision projects such as irrigation neglec-
ting other pressing needs, especially those 
of the poor 
Forced relocation of people in informal city 
settlements, pushing poor city dwellers 
to peripheral areas away from livelihood 
options 
Document past and present adaptation 
strategies and supplement them with 
relevant strategies and technologies, 
support local knowledge systems 
Facilitate improvements of production 
systems adapted to normal climate 
stress, like pastoralism and indigenous 
tree products, through strengthening 
marketing infrastructure, veterinary 
services, research and development, 
processing and value adding 
Evaluate how infrastructure provision 
may affect the climate change vulner-
ability of the poor, ensure poor people’s 
needs, for example water access for 
adaptation strategies 
Improve drainage systems and flooding 
protection in low-income areas, avoid 
relocation if possible and ensure conti-
nued access to livelihoods. Cooperate 
with the inhabitants on infrastructure 
and house improvements or if neces-
sary, on relocation
Lost potential for the use of ecosystem 
products and services for economic and 
social development  
Lack of innovative use of ecosystem servi-
ces and neglect of the importance of forest 
products in adapting to climate variability 
and change
Lack of access to existing and relevant 
knowledge and technologies, one-sided 
focus on conventional, centralised energy 
supply
  
2) Consequences of degraded ecosystems 
for vulnerability 
Climate change adaptation through 
improved and innovative management 
and use of local ecosystems 
Maintain and strengthen ecosystems, 
improve access for poor people. 
Emphasise community management and 
access to protected areas and counteract 
privatisation and large scale commercial 
exploitation of crucial adaptation 
resources, such as water or forest  
Strengthen people’s opportunities for 
both traditional and new ways of taking 
advantage of ecosystem services. Clarify 
land tenure and land use rights. Promote 
raw materials like Jatropha and other 
hardy biofuel crops and local collection 
and processing  
Facilitate the use of environmental  tech-
nologies, including agroforestry, organic 
farming techniques like mulching and 
planting of cover crops, harvest local 
resources like solar power, surplus 
biomass, wind and geothermal energy
3) Barriers hindering poor people’s 
adaptation strategies  
Lack of attention to the income sources of 
poor people 
Income generating activities during drought 
such as charcoal limited by the ambiguous 
legal framework, which siphons profits 
away from the poor producers, discourages 
investment and encourages unsustainable 
practices  
Discourses labelling adaptation strategies 
of the poor as unsustainable or primitive 
Little value adding to natural products and 
poor market position of products. Lack of 
infrastructure for transportation and 
information exchange adapted to the needs 
of the poor 
Marginalisation of nomadic pastoralism 
and barriers to migration 
Poor health limiting household labour and 
engaging in adaptation strategies 
Conflicts and insecurity leading to loss of 
lives and productive assets and making 
access to key resources for adaptation, 
such as drought grazing, unsafe  
Measures for removing structural and 
regulatory barriers 
Provide facts about the economic im-
portance of income generating activities 
performed by the poor. Facilitate south-
south transfer of experiences
Change the poor legal structures of 
the sector, promote efficient kilns for 
charcoal burning, promote sustain-
able practices of wood harvesting and 
growing
Uncover myths and exaggerations, iden-
tify underlying reasons for unsustain-
able practices, invest in research and 
development of livelihood and adaptation 
strategies based on local resources
Support small-scale processing plants 
products. Improve transport facilities 
(trains, buses, roads planned for cycles, 
carts and pedestrians) and other factors 
to access markets, provide relevant and 
timely market information  
Ensuring access to drought grazing 
areas, facilitating migration and 
seasonal trade through providing 
security and infrastructure (like water 
points, markets, roads, and health and 
veterinary services) 
Measures to reduce the incidence of 
malaria among poor, enhanced health 
systems, make treatment for HIV/AIDS 
available to poor 
Strengthen police posts and security in 
marginal areas, enhance conflict reso-
lution and civil society such as peace 
committees
Removing barriers to people’s adaptation strategies
People’s responses in the face of shocks and longer term changes can be both 
facilitated and hindered by government policies and measures, as well as de-
velopment projects. Many of the coping and adaptation strategies used by poor 
people are currently undermined by political, economic and legal structures. 
Such structures need to be targeted in efforts to reduce vulnerability. Economic 
structures that increase vulnerability include those creating increasing margi-
nality of on- and off-farm livelihoods and natural resource based activities, 
growing local inequality, environmental degradation, spread of HIV/AIDS, 
conflict and insecurity, and decreasing employment opportunities. 
Charcoal production, an increasingly widespread drought adaptation strategy 
many places in eastern and southern Africa, exemplifies how legal and econo-
mic structurs limit the profitability of the activities for poor rural producers, 
increasing their vulnerability. Charcoal production has been blamed for dry-
land forest loss but is the main energy source for cooking for a growing urban 
population. In Kenya, wood fuel, particularly charcoal production and trade, 
is providing direct employment for around 200.000 people and it is estimated 
that the total number of people involved in the charcoal trade during the year 
(including traders and vendors) is over 500.000, supporting two million depen-
dents. The contribution from charcoal to the Kenyan economy is comparable 
to the annual returns from tea exports (2002) (ESDA 2005). Contrary to popular 
belief, most of the charcoal produced in Kenya is sourced from individual farms 
and private land, mostly ranches. It is illegal to produce and transport charcoal 
in Kenya, but legal to sell, buy and consume in towns and cities. The banning of 
charcoal production is based on the assumption that charcoal is sourced from 
government land, leading to deforestation, while this accounts for less than a 
tenth of the total trees sourced for charcoal. This banning is a central barrier 
to charcoal production as a viable adaptation strategy as it channels the largest 
profits to traders and the authorities, discourages investment in the trade and 
encourages unsustainable practices of tree-felling without tree-planting as well 
as inefficient ways of producing the coal. In order to achieve a sustainable use 
of this potentially renewable energy resource, and improve the opportunities 
of income-generation for the poor, legal and economic structures of the sector 
must be changed (ESDA 2005, Bailis et al. 2006). 
In the longer term, if a transition to other cooking fuels is promoted, there are 
many opportunities for simultaneous transitions to other and modern uses of 
biomass resources, which have the potential for other income generation acti-
vities (ESMAP 2005). Biomass (included charcoal) is an indigenous, potentially 
sustainable renewable natural resource, but it must be managed and harvested 
effectively. 
6. WHAT SHOULD AGENCIES DO IN ORDER TO REDUCE 
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POOR?
This chapter has highlighted particular challenges and sources of vulnerability 
for poor populations in the face of climate variability and change, and presented 
emerging insights into ways that potential adaptation efforts can be designed 
and supported by government and development agency efforts. These provide 
a point of departure for discussing and developing ways of integrating climate 
change adaptation in the development work of agencies. 
One of the key challenges for development agencies in integrating climate 
change adaptation in development efforts is approaching climate change adap-
tation as a development issue. First, adaptation requires very different measu-
res from emission reduction efforts, and needs to be treated as an independent 
issue, rather than as an add-on, to emission mitigation. Second, adaptation 
efforts need to be comprehensive, focusing on enhancing adaptive capacity 
and reducing the societal factors causing vulnerability in addition to reducing 
climate risk itself (Eriksen et al. 2007). We have suggested that such changes 
specifically require understanding of the livelihoods and strategies to cope and 
adapt to climate change and other challenges; identification of innovative eco-
system management options; and removing barriers to local adaptation strate-
gies. This means that understanding of adaptation to climate change needs to 
be enhanced among governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in 
development aid, as well as in the country offices in developing countries. Since 
climate change adaptation affects all sectors of development, the issue cannot 
be delegated to an isolated sector or part of the organisation while it is ignored 
by the rest. Making good use of the poverty and development expertise that 
exist in these organisations is crucial in developing procedures for integrating 
climate change adaptation into development work. Climate change vulnerability 
concerns must be integrated into individual projects, and rather than applying 
“one-size-fits-all” solutions, it is necessary to evaluate what local factors create 
vulnerability in each context. 
Given the need to learn from emerging experiences, collaboration internationally 
between development agencies can enhance efforts to integration of climate 
change concerns. Agencies can also play a role in lifting adaptation issues higher 
on the agenda of international meetings and negotiation processes. Climate 
change and climate change adaptation in particular is not always high on develo-
ping countries’ agenda as here, too, climate has often been framed as an 
emissions and environmental issue only, and vulnerability of poor people is 
not well understood. Organisations can contribute to capacity building through 
research and south-south exchange of experiences and scholarships can fund 
students of the affected countries for higher educational level studies on the 
issue of climate change. Collaboration with development country research and 
civil society is likely to build capacity for both. 
Equally if not more important is the role that agencies can play in bringing 
climate change adaptation into dialogues with recipient countries, for example in 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and other development policy processes. 
The countries can be supported in their work for strengthening political 
leadership and enacting legislation related to climate change, vulnerability 
reduction and building of adaptive capacity among the poor. Agencies can also 
assist countries in increasing the budget for adaptation measures. Essentially, a 
type of poverty reduction planning less premised on economic growth, and more 
premised on reducing vulnerability of the poor needs to be promoted. It is 
necessary to challenge some political and economic structures as well as 
developments currently exacerbating vulnerability. 
7. CONCLUSION
The climate challenge highlights societal problems that are currently 
insufficiently addressed - the social and environmental conditions that make 
people vulnerable to a changing climate. To put it simply, fundamental societal 
changes are required to adapt in a way that makes the poor more able to secure 
a decent life in the face of climate change. Therefore, governments and 
development organisations also need to refocus their activities as a response to 
the climate challenge. 
Increasing efforts for understanding and strengthening existing livelihood 
adaptation strategies related to climate challenges is an important first step to 
this end. This is a strategy that makes a broad integration of climate change into 
the development agenda possible and also helps identify the vulnerability context 
that needs to be addressed, such as HIV/AIDS, disempowerment 
processes, or conflicts. It is a strategy that has the potential of reducing vulne-
rability of the poor, eradicate poverty and strengthen the capacity of poor people 
to handle multiple challenges. Such an approach also helps highlight potential 
conflicting interests and winners and losers from different types of adaptation 
interventions. Furthermore, interventions can focus on enhancing poor people’s 
access to natural resources, promotion of community management practices of 
ecosystems, facilitation of income generating activities through innovative use 
of ecosystem services and improved access to markets, as well as facilitating 
access to environmental technologies and south-south transfer of experiences, 
technologies and practices adapted to local needs and natural resources. 
Finally, the barriers to local adaptation strategies can be addressed. Adaptation 
interventions and poverty reduction measures that do not take the above con-
cerns into account run the risk of unintentionally increasing the vulnerability of 
some people and groups, especially the poor.
The practical examples of adaptation measures presented in this chapter show 
that a diversity of adaptation efforts are needed because of the range of 
challenges from climate change and the diversity of local contexts and existing 
strategies. Some of the measures outlined in Table 2, such as enhanced access 
to water and health infrastructure, are in line with what is already conside-
red ‘good practice’ in development interventions and underwrite the need to 
ensure that such good practice is implemented in practice. Other measures 
such as enhanced common property management rather than privatisation of 
resources challenge current development and liberalisation discourses. 
Importantly, some measures, including enhancing use and processing of local 
plant products are seldom prioritised in current development measures. 
Reducing the vulnerability of poor people involves refocusing measures 
towards strengthening climate-adapted strategies and technologies. 
Imposition of large scale measures and external technologies are likely to both 
marginalise local technologies and incomes further, make livelihoods more 
sensitive to climate variability and change, and potentially increase the 
vulnerability of many poor people. This latter observation represents one of the 
key challenges to agencies in the context of supporting adaptation in develo-
ping countries: the needs of the poor are often least heard, and often involve 
measures that may be perceived by some national authorities to attract less 
prestige, western technology and capital. Identifying the actual needs and 
interests of different poor groups in relation to climate change, and promoting 
these in the planning and implementation of development measures is 
therefore important in reducing vulnerability to climate change. Addressing 
the social factors that make any particular poor group vulnerable to climate 
change, be they privatisation of natural resources, declining health, and 
conflicts and insecurity, may well involve challenging existing political and 
economic structures.
Extreme droughts and floods are hitting Malawi. In Chikwawa in the south, people 
are desperate.                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                  Photo: Norwegian Church Aid/Hege Opseth
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The river in Keren in 
Eritrea is dry, and the 
people of Keren work 
hard to get access to 
clean water since the 
water level has 
decreased dramati-
cally in this part of the 
country. When droughts 
strike Eastern Africa, 
Keren is very vulne-
rable. The wells are 
empty, the river is dry 
six months a year, and 
people have to collect 
rain water to cover their 
needs for water.
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The climate threat is not only the biggest environmental problem in the world. 
According to the UN Environment Programme we will not be able to solve 
other problems such as famine and severe poverty, without resolving the 
climate problem. In other words, it is the world’s biggest problem and the 
world’s biggest challenge.
If we are to take the words spoken by Hans Blix seriously, it must have 
consequences. We must spend at least the same amount on fighting climate 
change as we do on the military and on combating terrorism. Are there 
politicians who dare bring about such a fundamental change to our way of 
thinking regarding national defence? Norway spends about ten times as much 
money on the Ministry of Defence as on the Ministry of the Environment. Even 
though a cold war from East is no longer the main threat, there is a lurking 
heat from all sides.  Perhaps the heat is mostly from the West?
THE NORWEGIAN CLIMATE 
POLICY – A HISTORY OF BROKEN 
PROMISES?
By Lars Haltbrekken, Chairman of Friends of the Earth Norway 
(Norges Naturvernforbund) 
”I am more worried about global warming than I am of any major military conflict.” 
These words were spoken by a former weapons inspector in Iraq to the New York Times 
right after he had left Iraq in the beginning of 2003. 
On the picture emis-
sions from different 
regions in the USA 
are compared to 
emissions from 
other countries. 
Today, the USA is 
the world’s largest 
polluter of climate-
changing gases. 
However, in a few 
years’ time, the 
nation will be 
surpassed by China.
The above picture compares the emissions of the different regions of the 
Unites States of America with the emissions from other countries. 
At present, the US is the world’s biggest pollutor of greenhouse gases, 
however, in a few years it will be surpassed by China.
The international climate negotiations, which the USA has more or less with-
drawn from, are characterized by stagnation. In this situation it is more 
imperative than ever that some countries become a role model, assume 
responsibility and show that it is possible to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions. As the richest country in the world, Norway has every 
opportunity for once again playing an important role in the international 
environment work. However, in that case, there is a need for redefining the 
climate policy. A review of the Norwegian climate policy shows that 16 years 
have passed since the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) and government 
made any significant decisions regarding climate measures. That occurred 
in 1991, when Gro Harlem Brundtland, with the present Prime Minister Jens 
Stoltenberg as State Secretary in the Ministry of the Environment, introduced 
the CO2 tax. The tax has been of great importance in limiting the growth of the 
Norwegian CO2 emissions. Without this tax, the emissions could have been 
15-20% higher than they are at present.
Since the introduction of this tax, the evidence of man’s impact on the 
changing climate have become increasingly stronger. And the tax has not 
reduced the emissions, merely prevented a bigger growth than the one we 
have experienced. It has slowed down the speed of, but not reversed, the 
development the way that the situation requires.
THE NORWEGIAN CLIMATE HISTORY – A HISTORY OF BROKEN 
PROMISES
The elections to the Parliament (Storting) in 1989 became a Norwegian 
championship in promises regarding the environment. The parties competed 
in giving the most ambitious environmental promises. On the climate issue, 
The Centre Party (Senterpartiet) went the furthest. They promised us a 50% 
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reduction in f the CO2 emissions within the year 2000. The result of the 
parliamentary negotiations on June 14th 1989 was that Norway, after a 
proposal from the Conservative Party (Høyre), would stabilise its emissions at 
the 1989 level within 2000. In 2000, the CO2 emissions were 22% higher than 
they were in 1989, and the total greenhouse gas emissions were 10% higher. 
What had happened in the meantime? Little had been done to reduce the 
emissions, more to undermine the objective. The Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO) had been more or less non-participatory when the 
Parliament discussed the CO2 target; however, little by little they became 
aware of what the consequences would entail. As a following, they worked 
hard to undermine the objective.
The Norwegian proposal was the first of its kind in the world, but still not good 
enough to solve the enormous challenges we were faced with and still are 
facing. If the Norwegian authorities had maintained the target and seen to it 
that measures were introduced to reach it, Norway would  have been one of 
the few countries today that stood a good chance of obtaining our international 
obligations. Instead we have become one of the countries that are furthest 
away from fulfilling our obligations.
After the International Panel on Climate Change presented its first main 
report in 1990, the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, where the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
signed and the first demonstrations against the construction of a gas power 
plant in North-Western Norway in the early 1990ies, a great deal of the climate 
debate faded out.
After the decision by the Parliament (Storting) to stabilise the emissions, two 
ministers of the environment spent 6 years to present a white paper on climate 
describing how to go about stabilising the emissions. The conclusion of this 
paper can be described in the following: The CO2 target is upheld, but we will 
not achieve it. The minister of the environment, at that time, Thorbjørn 
Berntsen used all his rhetorical skills to emphasize how little Norway was in 
the big context and that whatever we did, it would not make a difference.
In the following years, this argument has been repeated over and over. 
Norway’s emissions correspond to 0,16% of the total emissions in the world. 
If we include the emissions from the combustion of the oil and gas that we 
export, our share will be 2% of the total emissions. Most countries in the world 
can present a similar argumentation. Last year the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, Tony Blair, tried to excuse his country since they only represented 2% 
of the total emissions. China is repeatedly pointed out as one of the big 
sinners. What if China’s leaders decided to divide the country into small 
provinces? Each province would only have contributed to a small share of the 
total emissions and thereby they could refrain from doing something. 
I can use the same argument myself in regards to my tax contribution to the 
Norwegian state. Even though I pay a substantial portion of my wages in taxes, 
it would bare little impact if I stopped paying tax. My contribution is probably 
much lower than 0,16% of the total tax income to the Norwegian state. 
It goes without saying that there is no hold to such an argument. It is the 
accumulated total of all emissions that defines the problem.
Even though the white paper of Berntsen did not have any importance in the 
form of reduced emissions in Norway, it revived the climate debate. Another 
issue contributing to the debate was the planned construction of gas plants. 
This time a company called Naturkraft made a conscious use of environmental 
arguments in order to gain accept for its plans. The slogan became Gas Power 
Replaces Coal and later on it was discovered that the slogan was the work of 
the communication bureau Geelmuyden/Kiese.
Coincidentally, the Storting opened for the construction of gas power plants in 
Norway on the 7th anniversary for having adopted a resolution to stabilise the 
CO2 emissions at the 1989 level.
In the autumn of 1996, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate gave the go-ahead for the gas power plant plans of Naturkraft. 
An appeal concerning the case was made to the government, and in the spring 
of 1997, an enormous opposition against the plans arose. The gas plant issue 
became the symbol of the new environment debate. Nearly 3000 people were 
willing to resort to civil disobedience to stop the plans, and the Prime Minis-
ter, at that time, Thorbjørn Jagland received a letter from former Alta cam-
paigners asking him to reconsider. The memories of the Alta conflict 16 years 
previously were probably a significant contributing factor when Jagland asked 
the contractors to postpone the building start that was planned for the sum-
mer of 1997. In this way, Jagland avoided a messy conflict that would have had 
a strong effect on the elections that took place in the autumn that same year.
In December 1997, the ministers of the environment gathered in the Japanese 
emperor city Kyoto for the final negotiations of what has later become known 
as the Kyoto protocol. The suspense was present to the very last minute of 
the negotiations and Al Gore himself, the Vice President of the United Sta-
tes, participated in order to reach an agreement. The outcome was that the 
rich countries committed themselves to an approximate 5% total emissions 
reduction. As one of only a few countries, Norway was allowed to increase its 
emissions by 1% compared to the 1990 level. Even this allocation would later 
on prove very difficult for us to comply with.
Due to the gas power debate in Norway, the Norwegian journalists were well 
represented in Kyoto. The climate issue overshadowed the other issues of the 
environment debate.
The 1997 elections in Norway resulted in a new government, the first Bondevik 
government. All three parties in this government, The Christian Democratic 
Party (Kristelig Folkeparti), The Liberals (Venstre) and The Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet) had entered the elections with a promise to put an end to gas 
power plant plans. They kept this promise by setting very strict requirements 
to the levels of emissions permitted to escape from the gas power plants. 
The requirement was for a 90% removal of all CO2 emissions. These 
requirements were based on plans presented by Hydro for the first gas 
power plant handling CO2 in April 1998. The strict requirements for emission 
reductions eventually led the Labour Party (Arpbeiderpartiet) and the 
Conservative Party (Høyre) to demand the resignation of the Bondevik 
government on March 9th, 2000.
The new Labour Party government made sure that the new allocations given to 
Naturkraft were in accordance with the wishes of the company and they also 
gave permission for the construction of a polluting gas power plant in Skogn 
in Northern Trøndelag. The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (Statens 
Forurensningstilsyn, SFT) was overruled by Prime Minister Stoltenberg, who 
forced them to allocate emissions in agreement with the application from the 
gas power plant contractors. SFT was unable to provide a professional explanation 
for this allowance and expressed that quite clearly when the issue was presented for 
the media.
In the spring of 2002, the Minister of the Environment, at that time, Børge 
Brende presented his white paper on climate. It proposed a series of green-
house gas emission reduction measures. One of the measures was to reduce 
oil heating by 25%. At the present time, five years after the presentation of this 
paper a government programme for economic support to those who choose to 
replace their oil heaters with pellet heaters will be offered. Offshore 
electrification, that would have provided a substantial emission reduction, has 
yet to become  in demand, in spite of it being listed as one of the key measures 
in the white paper on climate.
In the autumn of 2005, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) 
presented its plan of action for reduced greenhouse gas emissions. The plan 
presented a great potential for a reduction in the emissions. The report by The 
Norwegian Commission on Low Emissions (Lavutslippsutvalget) published 
in the following year, the autumn of 2006, drew the same conclusion. In this 
report, measures to be taken for a 2/3 reduction within 2050 is recommended. 
According to the report, it can be done and at a reasonable cost. 
Quota based emission trading
The purchase of quotas and support for climate measures in other countries, 
issues that many bring in to the debate, are of course important. However, it is 
important to emphasize that this must be in addition to the emission reduction 
measures in the rich countries. Without a substantial reduction of the 
emissions in the rich countries, we will not be able to deal with the climate 
threat in a proper way. It is obvious that the rich countries must contribute to 
ensure a welfare growth in the developing countries without the same 
environmental consequences that our welfare has had. However, to believe 
that this is sufficient is absolutely wrong. Even with extensive quota purchases 
and transference of technology, the emissions from the developing countries 
will increase. If the world is to succeed in halving its emissions within 2050, 
and at the same time increase the welfare level in the poor countries, we 
cannot evade the fact that the most substantial emission reductions must be 
made in the rich countries. Without these reductions there is no room for the 
expected increase in emissions to come from the poor part of the world. In 
order to obtain an equal distribution of the resources in the world, the 
emissions of the rich countries must be reduced by 70-90%, in addition to 
extensive climate change measures in the developing countries. 
Through the Kyoto protocol the countries that are to reduce their emissions 
have in part been given the possibility to do so by purchasing emission 
reductions made elsewhere. The protocol has three flexible mechanisms that 
can be used, presupposing that this is only a supplement to national emission 
reduction measures. The three flexible mechanisms are quota trading 
between countries with emission obligation, possibilities for supporting 
emission reduction measures in countries with an economy in a transition 
phase, and the green development mechanism regarding support to emission 
reduction measures in developing countries.
In the climate debate the quota trading and the other two flexible mechanisms 
are regarded by many as the only possible solution. It is often claimed that we 
should direct all our economic resources at the purchase of quotas from other 
countries. This would be both cheaper and would also give a greater emission 
reduction for the money spent. If used in the right way, the flexible 
mechanisms will be very important when it comes to reducing emissions. 
However, we must not fool ourselves in to believing that it is sufficient to have 
emission reductions in  big developing countries such as China and India. 
If we are to reduce the world’s total greenhouse emission to half, it means that 
we need to implement significant emission reductions in the rich countries. 
Presupposing that we through the flexible mechanisms will be able to reduce 
the emissions in the big developing countries by 20% in comparison to today’s 
level - probably a most unrealistic presupposition since they most likely will 
have to increase their emissions - the rich countries must reduce their 
emissions by 70-80% in order to succeed in cutting the world’s total emissions 
to half. This illustrates how important it is to not only purchase quotas in other 
countries, but that this is done in addition to a significant emission reduction at 
the national level. This is the only way we can overcome the climate change.
Through the white paper of Brende, it was approved to establish a quota 
system for CO2 in Norway, which was supposed to be a forerunner for the 
international quota trading market that will commence on January 1st, 2008. 
The quota system for CO2 has now been functioning for two years, but 
unfortunately, without us registering considerable emissions reductions. 
The main reason for this is that the allocation of quotas has been too 
generous, and that they have been allocated for free. The quota trading system 
was introduced on January 1st, 2005 and will be in function up to December 
31st, 2007. Thereafter, Norway will probably co-ordinate with the European 
Union Trading Quota System and thus become a more important part of the 
international quota trading market.
In 2006, quotas were allotted to the quota-bound companies in Norway 
corresponding to a total emission that was 10% higher than that of 2005, and 
for 2007 the allocated emission quotas corresponded to a 16% increase. In 
2005 the industries of the EU were allotted quotas for the emission of 
approximately 100 millions of tons of CO2 more than they actually needed. This 
corresponds to almost twice the amount of the Norwegian emissions. The 
industries in the EU have in fact received permission for the emissions of more 
than they presently do, and that for free. This extensive allocation resulted in a 
dramatic fall in the prices of CO2 quotas in the spring of 2006. Again, this results 
in a lack of emission reductions because it becomes less profitable to reduce 
them.
In the course of the spring 2007, the government will present a proposal for a 
quota system for the period of 2008-2012. This system must take into account 
the lessons learned from the present test system and must ensure emission 
reductions. If not, then there is no reason for using a quota trading system as a 
measure in the climate policy. 
A quota system for greenhouse gases must be based on that fewer quotas than 
needed are allocated. So far, the politicians in both the EU and in Norway have 
done the opposite. 
Today the Norwegian oil and gas industry is exempt from the quota system, but 
is eager to be included. In so doing, the companies hope to avoid the CO2 tax. 
If the quota system replaces the CO2 tax, it will become considerably cheaper 
to pay for the CO2 emissions from the continental shelf than it is today. If so, 
a significant weakening of the Norwegian climate change policy would be the 
result. Therefore, the government must ensure the use of double measures. 
It must not become less costly than today to produce CO2 from the Norwegian 
platforms.
A main problem with the quota system is that the quotas are allocated for free. 
Thus, the environment policy has been turned up-side down. The pollutor will 
no longer pay, but be paid. The climate problem is serious, and the effects of 
the greenhouse gas emissions are costly for society. Naturally, those who cause 
the emissions should also be the ones who have to pay for them.
Today’s quota system may also reduce the willingness of the industry to cut its 
emissions. Trade and industry expect that the extent of the future free quota 
allocation decisions, will be based on today’s emissions. In that case, it does not 
pay to reduce the emissions, because as a result you reduce the extent of the 
free quotas you are allocated in the future. This speaks out the urgent need for 
abolishing the system of free quotas. 
Besides, the system of free quotas to new business establishments under-
mines the need for structural changes to reduce emissions. Part of the 
intention of a quota system for greenhouse gas emissions, is to stimulate for 
growth in environment-friendly industries and to restrain the growth in 
industries with high emissions. In short, the system is to stimulate to a shift 
from fossil to renewable energy. 
Within the European Union an auction of 10% of the quotas for the period of 
2008 – 2012 will be allowed. Norway has been given the opportunity for 
auctioning far more than that. In order to obtain the most well functioning 
system possible, all the quotas should be sold. Then the problem with alloca-
ting too many quotas would be avoided. If Norway, starting in 2008, is able to 
establish an effective system for auctioning quotas, then Norway will assume 
a lead role in the international development of measures to combat climate 
change. 
The necessary emission reductions required will not be 
obtained through a quota system which, at best, reduces the emission growth 
and makes Norwegian industrial leaders refrain from reducing emissions, for 
fear of obtaining fewer quotas in the next round.
WHY ARE EMISSIONS INCREASING?
We use increasingly more energy. Since 1990, our energy consumption has 
increased by 14%. This energy comes to a great extent from fossil fuels, 
leading to an increase in emissions. The fact that we travel increasingly more 
and build bigger houses and vacation homes, are the main reasons for the 
rising emissions, as long as the wealth is based on fossil fuels.
In a few years Norway will comply with its climate obligations. Presently, 
Norwegian emissions are at 8,5% above the 1990 level. The Norwegian 
emissions are expected to continue increasing. According to the latest 
prognosis from the Ministry of Finance in the national budget for 2007, it is 
expected that in 2010 emissions will have increased by 18%. This increase 
does not take into account the construction of the gas power plant at Mongstad 
that will not have CO2 capture and storage (CCS) until 2014 nor the emissions 
released from the gas power plant at Kårstø, for which at present a waste 
treatment plan is being discussed. In total, these two development projects 
will increase emissions by more than 4% for every year they are in operation 
without waste handling. According to the Kyoto protocol, Norway was allowed to 
increase its emissions by 1% in the same period. The increase is to a great ex-
tent due to more road traffic and an increased activity at the continental shelf.
Increased emissions from the petroleum sector 
While the gas power debate was taking place, emissions from other parts of 
society increased, especially from the petroleum sector and the transport sec-
tor. From 1990 to 2004, 
emissions from the pe-
troleum industry increa-
sed by 79%. Emission 
caused by road traffic 
increased by nearly 30% 
in the same period. This 
growth contributes to a 
great extent to the fact 
that we are removing 
us further and further 
away from the obliga-
tions we have according 
to the Kyoto protocol. 
Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway 
Development and projections 1990 - 2020
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PRESENT AND FUTURE EMISSIONS
The future emissions have not yet been created. The cars that we drive, the 
heaters we use in our houses and the big industrial plants are all nearing their 
expiration date and will be replaced by new and better alternatives. This will 
be our great opportunity for change. If we are able to ensure that the new car 
we buy is an environment-friendly one, society will become increasingly more 
environment-friendly. 
At present there are mainly three emission sources in Norway; Oil and gas, 
transport and industry. For all emissions, environment-friendly alternatives 
exist. Measures must be taken to stimulate the consumers to choose the 
environment-friendly alternative. Polluting should be made expensive and 
choosing environment-friendly alternatives should be less costly. Moreover, 
the use of fossil energy should be prohibited when other environment-friendly 
alternatives exist, for example heating of buildings.
Oil and gas
The oil and gas industry causes emissions both by the production of oil and 
gas and later on when it is burned to heat a house or run a car engine. 
In Norway, the exploration of oil and gas represents about 20% of the 
emissions. Together with the road traffic, theses are the fastest growing 
emissions. However, Norway is not where the Norwegian exploration of oil and 
gas is the greatest. As much as 93% of the emissions take place where the oil 
is consumed, and that is primarily in other countries. Since we are a 
significant exporter of oil, number three in the world, it makes us a 
considerable contributor to the global climate change.
In order to reduce emissions from the petroleum industry, there are first and 
foremost two possible solutions that can contribute to this. Firstly, we have 
to limit the exploration of oil and gas, and the best way to do so is to deny the 
petroleum industry access to new areas. This is a crucial argument for pre-
venting the petroleum industry from operating in our most vulnerable ocean 
areas, the Barents Sea and Lofoten/Vesterålen. An effective measure for  
reducing the exploration speed is by establishing petroleum free fishing areas, 
which are areas from which no oil or gas will be extracted. Lofoten/Vesterålen 
is such an area.
The emissions from oil and gas extraction come from small gas power plants 
that produce  energy at the offshore oil platforms. Instead of individual gas 
power plants supplying the energy needed to run the oil platform, alternative 
environment-friendly generated energy should be provided. Electrification of 
the offshore oil platforms implies pulling a power cable from onshore to the 
platforms. This would then replace the polluting gas power plants running the 
platform. The gas power plants that supply energy for the oil production have 
a very low efficiency rate and have a CO2 emission per utilized energy unit that 
can be compared to coal-fired power plants.
Road traffic
In Norway, one fourth of greenhouse gas emissions are caused by the 
transport sector. When 40 people travel in a bus, each one of them is causing 
an emission of only 1/10 compared to if they had been driving separate cars. 
Therefore, the politicians must make it more efficient and less expensive to 
travel by bus and by train than by car. Travelling by train is much more 
environment-friendly than travelling by plane. The politicians must ensure that 
new houses, schools, shops and work places are located in a short distance 
from each other, so that more people can walk and travel by bicycle to and 
from their daily tasks.
In 2006, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT) made a report to the 
Norwegian government recommending that a requirement was imposed for 
the share of bio-fuels sold to be at least 4% of the total fuel sales within 2010. 
So far, no such legislation has been proposed. 
Air traffic 
The number of passengers travelling to and from Norwegian airports is 
increasing rapidly.  Inexpensive tickets create a growth in the traffic and cause 
new damaging climate change trends. And our domestic travel is at the top of 
the list when we take into account the number of flights made per person, 
compared to other European countries. Avinor (operator of airports and air 
traffic control in Norway) estimates that the number of passengers travelling 
via Norwegian airports will increase by as much as 370% from 1990-2040. This 
is more than a fourfold increase.
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There are no taxes imposed on the aircraft fuel used for international traffic, 
and the Kyoto protocols have no emission requirements for planes flying 
between countries. Then polluting becomes cheap. The strong increase in 
traffic has caused a 73% increase in the EU’s CO2 emissions due to aircraft fuel 
in the time period 1990-2003. The increase is expected to be  150% for the 
period of 1990 to 2012. In addition to emissions of CO2 the air traffic is also 
responsible for causing climate change by the emission of other causative 
agents such as nitrogen oxides and water vapour. Together with other effects 
this makes the air traffic’s influence on climate change approximately the 
double of the effect caused by the CO2 emissions. 
It is necessary to restrict international air traffic, either by imposing taxes or by 
a requirement for the purchase of emissions rights in a quota market, a 
measure the EU is considering establishing. Also for the domestic traffic the 
taxes must be increased so that the principle of  the pollutor paying the costs, 
will apply. Taxes imposed on air traffic services can become an important 
source of income for development assistance, an initiative that has been taken, 
and partly implemented, by France and a few other countries. Environment and 
development issues are closely interlinked, and it is therefore natural to impose 
a tax on activities that cause climate change, activities that pay little or no 
environment taxes. 
Together with increased taxes and/or trades with emissions quotas, efforts 
should be made to strengthen alternative and more environment-friendly forms 
of transport. The railway connections between the biggest cities in Southern 
Norway should be improved with more frequent departures and shorter travel 
time. The same goes for the connections to our neighbouring countries’ 
capitals. 
SWEDEN – THE PIONEER COUNTRY THAT NORWAY SHOULD HAVE BEEN?
Sweden has by far surpassed the role of Norway as a pioneer country in re-
gards to environmental policy in practice. During the period of 1990 – 2005, 
Sweden reduced its emissions by 7,5%. In the same time period Norway 
increased its emissions by 8,5%. What have the Swedes done that we should 
have been doing?
Tougher climate targets 
In order to succeed with emissions reductions it is important to have objectives. 
Sweden has as its target a 25% reduction of greenhouse gases within 2020. The 
great majority of the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) supports this target. 
For the time being, Norway has no such climate target. Minister of the 
Environment, Bjørnøy, has pronounced that we will not be less ambitious than 
the EU. When the EU presented its proposal for climate policy they said that in 
any case they would cut emissions by 20%. Provided that a new climate policy 
was agreed upon, they would work for a 30% cut in emissions. 
In addition, Sweden has an objective for freeing themselves from their depen-
dency on oil for heating and transport within 2020. Right before the summer 
of 2006 the “Kommissionen mot oljeberoende” (the Commission Against Oil 
Dependence) presented its report, stating how Sweden would be able to fulfil 
these targets.
According to the Kyoto protocol the Swedes are allowed a 4% increase within 
2010 compared to the 1990 levels. The Swedish Riksdagen expressed the need 
for a more ambitious objective and imposed a reduction target of 4%. In the 
Swedish white paper on climate of 2006, this target remained locked. It was 
also concluded that the target will be obtained without the use of quota trading 
or other flexible mechanisms mentioned in the Kyoto protocol. At the present 
time it seems likely that they will over comply with this target.
Neither the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) nor the government has ever 
spoken for a more stringent national target the way Sweden has. Furthermore 
it is clear that we will make use of  the purchase of quotas to comply with our 
international obligations.
Bio-energy
It is especially in the efforts of promoting bio-energy that the Swedes are far 
ahead of us. In Norway 15TWh bio-energy is produced per year. In comparison, 
110 TWh is produced in Sweden. The main reason for the higher share in 
Sweden is a higher tax on polluting energy resources, and a higher tax on 
electricity. The el tax in Sweden is more than double the tax in Norway.
Bio-fuel
In Sweden 5% bio-ethanol is blended in with nearly all kinds of petrol that 
is sold. There are more than 600 petrol stations with separate bio-ethanol 
pumps. In Norway there are two. Besides, every sixth car sold in Sweden is 
an environment-friendly car. This is possible because of the tax exemption for 
bio-fuels. In the revised budget in the spring of 2006 the Norwegian Minister 
of Finance announced a similar exemption. Hopefully this will also result in an 
increase in the sales of cars run on bio-fuels in Norway. However, it will not 
help much if the authorities do not follow up and impose a requirement for a 
percentage rate on the sale of bio-fuels.
Tax on fossil energy sources
In Sweden the tax imposed on fuel oil is 28,2 øre/Kwh (NOK), whereas in 
Norway it is 11,8 øre/Kwh1. Since 1990, the tax imposed on fuel oil in Sweden 
has resulted in a 40% reduction in emissions from household heating due to 
the conversion from oil to bio-energy2.
Norway introduces a CO2 tax on the use of natural gas from July 1st, 2007. 
This will be  4-5 øre/Kwh. In Sweden it is 16,7 øre/Kwh (NOK).
Local investment programmes
In the past few years Sweden has carried out big environment investment
1 The Ministry of Finance
2 Sweden’s 4th national report on the climate, 2003
programmes. In the period from 1998 to 2004 NOK 3,5 billion has been inves-
ted in measures to reduce the effects of climate change. In Norway, no such 
investment programme exists, however, ENOVA contributes some funds to 
similar measures (Enova SF is a public enterprise owned by the Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.).
 
Energy conservation 
One of the most important climate measures is to reduce the energy 
consumption. Sweden aims to have a 20% reduction in the energy 
consumption per heated area surface within 2020, and a 50% reduction with
in 2050. In order to achieve this, there are a series of support programmes for 
energy saving:
 NOK 450 million is allocated per year for municipal energy advisor service 
 Investments for increased energy efficiency in public buildings give a 30% 
    tax reduction. This represents NOK 1,67 billion per year.
 NOK 250 million per year is given to support the conversion from electrical 
    heating to other sources of renewable heating. 
 NOK 75 million per year is allocated for support to convert from oil heaters 
    to other environment-friendly heating installations
In Norway, funds for energy efficiency measures are channelled through 
ENOVA. In 2004, this represented NOK 204 million3. 
Information 
In 2002 and 2003 Sweden spent NOK 50 million on an information campaign 
regarding climate change. Presently, Norway is about to launch  a similar 
campaign, but has so far only allocated NOK 6 million for the first year. 
Railway
Sweden will spend 3-4 times as much on expanding the railway in 2007 as 
Norway will. They already have a railway network in place making it possible 
to travel between the two biggest cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg in three 
hours. In Norway, it takes more than double the time to travel between Oslo 
and Bergen, in spite of the distance being only a few metric miles longer.
A NATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENT
The Prime Minister Stoltenberg’s new year speech on January 1st, 2007, will 
hopefully become a turning point in regards to the Norwegian climate policy. 
The first new year’s speech he held, on January 1st, 2001 became historical 
for the Norwegian watercourse conflict. At the time he said that “The time for 
extensive hydroelectric power plant building has passed”. This stopped the 
development of valuable watercourses in Nordland, where the excavators were 
ready to start. This resulted in the conservation of several watercourses, most 
recently the Vefsna watercourse flowing from Sweden through Norway and 
into Mosjøen. It is our hope that the new year’s speech of 2007 becomes the 
same important milestone for the Norwegian climate policy and that we will 
have a government that proposes ambitious plans for the reduction of 
3 Enova’s Statements of Income 2005
greenhouse gas emissions. 
After his speech, the Prime Minister stated that one of the most important 
tasks for this government is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is most 
agreeable that Mr. Stoltenberg emphasized this responsibility so strongly. 
Only one year previously we find a new year’s speech without any reference to 
the environment. 
On important issues where a Parliamentary resolution affects the majority of 
the inhabitants in a country and extends over a long time period, the 
political parties seek to reach a broad agreement. The discussion concerning 
the pension agreement is one example of this. The government seeks to have 
the broadest possible majority to ensure that the coming pension system will 
not be ratified after the parliamentary elections in 2009. The National Insuran-
ce Scheme was introduced in 1967, and also in this case a broad agreement 
was important. The National Insurance Scheme was not to become a sacrifice 
in continuing political rematches. And in 1945, after the war, there was a broad 
agreement in the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) that the plan for the 
reconstruction of Norway should not become an arena for political rematches. 
Why is it that this is not the case for environmental issues? At present, the 
climate threat is the biggest challenge of mankind, and it is much too impor-
tant to become a mere political argument between the parties. The opposition 
states that everything was better before, whereas the government states that 
everything is better now. However, emissions increased before and they are 
increasing now. We have to put an end to this game of who is or was the worst. 
If we do not manage to agree upon an ambitious climate policy, we all stand at 
risk for losing, with a climate that will have changed dramatically.
Friends of the Earth Norway have spoken for a broad climate agreement in 
the Norwegian Parliament. The proposal has been well received by nearly 
all the parties of the Parliament, with the exception of the Progress Party 
(Fremskrittspartiet). We must start a discussion regarding what we can do, as 
well as an agreement on what measures to take. What we do accomplish the 
next 10-20 years is decisive for the extent of the climate change.  The climate 
agreement must not be characterized by compromise alone. The Parliament 
(Storting) will not pass a resolution on a mediocre pension system when 
negotiating a pension arrangement that nobody is satisfied with.
A national climate agreement has to result in a national effort where the 
industry, the economic life, the central and the local authorities, the research 
environment and the big organisations contribute. A long term perspective is 
important, especially for the ones working to reduce emissions. They must 
know that this policy will be valid for a long time and not be at risk for a 
sudden change after the next elections. Then they will have a policy assurance 
to base their decisions and investments on. It is the rich countries that have to 
shoulder the historical responsibility for the global warming that we are 
experiencing today. If we are to have any expectations about involving the 
major developing countries, a few rich countries must assume the lead and 
examplify that it is possible to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases.
Stagnation is the best word to describe the situation of the international 
climate negotiations. Even though we recognize the problem, the willingness 
to take on new obligations regarding emission reductions is scarce. There is a 
desperate need for countries to assume responsibility and become an example 
to follow. Some countries have assumed responsibility and have become an 
example to follow. During the climate negotiations in Nairobi in 2006, Germany 
spoke for a 30% emission reduction within the European Union by 2020. The 
Germans were willing to cut their emissions by 40%. Such declarations create 
progress.
If we are to have any expectations about involving the major developing 
countries, a few rich countries must assume the lead and examplify that it is 
possible to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. It is the rich countries 
that must assume the burden of the historical responsibility for the global 
warming that we are experiencing today.
The Norwegian Minister of the Environment, Helen Bjørnøy, has declared 
that Norway will not be any less ambitious than the European Union and that, 
together with the European Union, we will work for an international agreement 
obligating the rich counties to make substantial reductions in the years to 
come. In addition, she wants an agreement obligating the world to halve their 
emissions within 2050. 
OUR HOPES TO A CLIMATE AGREEMENT:
In a climate agreement the parties must dare to think grand and ambitious 
thoughts, both short term as well as long term. In order to reduce emissions 
of greenhouse gases to an acceptable level so as to avoid an average global 
temperature increase of more than 2 degrees and to have major developing 
countries participate in the work, the rich countries must commit themselves 
to at least 30% emissions reductions within 2020. Within 2050 the total 
emissions of the world must be halved, which means emissions from the rich 
countries must be reduced by 80-90% by that time. This must be the 
pronounced Norwegian position in the international negotiations.
We have gathered a series of essential points that we think should form the 
basis of a national climate agreement:
50% reduction in total emissions within 2020
As one of the richest countries in the world, Norway holds a unique 
opportunity and special responsibility for leading the way in regards to the 
climate policy. Sweden has set the objective to become independent of fossil 
fuels within 2020, whereas the EU has decided on a minimum 20% reduction 
in emissions within 2020, and a 30% reduction within 2020 if a new, obligating 
international environment agreement preceding the Kyoto protocol comes into 
being. Norway should follow Germany’s lead and declare that we go further 
than the EU. We should therefore have a 50% emissions reduction compared 
to the 1990 levels within 2020.
80% reduction in total emissions within 2050
The EU says that the world’s developed countries must cut their emissions by 
60-80% within 2050. As one of the richest countries in the world, Norway must 
assume responsibility for emissions reductions corresponding to a reduction 
of at least 80% within 2050.
No increase in emissions until 2010
Børge Brende of the Conservative Party of Norway has spoken for allowing the 
emissions in 2010 to become no higher than the 2000 level. This implies that 
in 2010 there will be emissions of no more than 54 tons of CO2 equivalents in 
Norway. With the expected increase in emissions from the three gas power 
plants (Kårstø, Mongstad and Snøhvit), it means that powerful measures must 
be implemented in many sectors to keep the emission levels low. 
Targets for each Parliament period
Separate climate targets should be decided on for each Parliament period. 
The targets for each Parliament should be calculated based on the targets that 
are decided for 2020 and 2050.
A new, ambitious international climate agreement
Norway must work for a more comprehensive and ambitious climate 
agreement to succeed the Kyoto protocol. The rich countries must have a 
30% emission reduction within 2020, and the world’s total emissions must be 
halved within 2050. Then the developed countries must reduce their emissions 
by 60-80%. This is in accordance with the targets of the European Union in the 
work with a new international climate agreement.
20% reduction in the total energy consumption within 2020
Norway is among the countries with the highest energy consumption in the 
world. This energy consumption cannot continue to increase. Norway has a 
great potential for implementing cost-effective energy efficiency and 
releasing measures. The objective of the European Union is a 20% reduction 
in the total energy consumption within 2020. In Aftenposten, on January 17th, 
Børge Brende speaks for a similar objective for Norway. Norway must set this 
target. This will imply that the energy consumption in Norway will be reduced 
by 58 TWh compared with today’s total energy consumption of 290 TWh. 
No gas power without CO2 cleansing
All of the new gas power concessions must have a full scale CO2 capture and 
storage from day one. Gas power plants under construction must as soon as 
possible make use of this technology and plans must be made for each plant 
in order to ensure a rapid implementation. According to the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), it is possible for Kårstø to have a 
CO2 cleansing processing in place within 2011/2012. At Mongstad there is an 
agreement in place for CO2 cleansing within 2014 at the latest. There are no 
plans for the Snøhvit plant yet. Therefore, a work for implementing a plan for 
CO2 cleansing must be carried out for Snøhvit as well.
5,75% bio-fuels
Norway should adapt the objective of the EU that bio-fuels should account for at 
least 5,75% of the total fuel amount  within 2010. Bio-fuels have the potential to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases considerably from the transport sector. 
In order to make the most of this potential, the bio-fuels used in Norway, should 
primarily be based on domestic waste and raw material production.
15TWh renewable energy within 2016/15
At present, Norway has no energy crisis, however, first and foremost we have 
a heating crisis. A great share of our energy consumption is for household 
heating. This energy can be released and replaced by renewable heating 
sources. 15TWh new, renewable heat sources should be built within 2016. Nor-
way spends approximately 1/3 of its total electricity production on the heating of 
buildings. A large portion of this could have been avoided or replaced by rene-
wable heating energy.
The production of heating energy must be granted a production support per 
kWh, like the electricity power production will have. This will result in a far 
more stable and long term based system. According to the Norwegian Bio Ener-
gy Association, this would give 10TWh new bio-energy within 2016. In addition, 
new constructions should be upgraded for a better usage of solar energy. Ac-
cording to the Norwegian District Heating Association (Fjernvarmeforeningen), 
30% of the energy for heating needs in Norwegian households could be supplied 
by solar energy. If solar energy had been made use of in all existing households, 
it would account for more than 10TWh energy per year.
More renewable energy within 2020
Norway primarily uses renewable electricity from waterpower on shore. 
However, in the energy sector at the continental shelf, nearly all energy 
consumed is based on fossil fuels. As previously noted, emissions from the 
energy sector at the continental shelf have seen a big increase. By having a long 
term perspective on the investments made in renewable energy  production for 
the off-shore energy supply to the continental shelf, there will be a big reducti-
on in Norway’s CO2 emissions.
The government should continue to give support for upgrading existing water 
power plants. The upgrades can contribute to an increased energy production of 
1-2TWh per year, without any added strain on the environment.
A maximum emission from new cars: 80 g CO2/km within 2012
In 1996, the EU set the target that the average CO2 emissions from new cars 
should be no more than 120 grams of CO2/km. Norwegian authorities should 
have as a target that this emissions requirement must be complied with in 
Norway within 2012, and that a requirement to not emit more than 80 grams of 
CO2/km must be complied with by 2020. 
The outphasing of fossil energy for heating purposes within 2012
There should be an objective for the ban of the use of fossil energy for heating 
purposes after 2012. Presently, annual emissions of approximately 
3 million tons of CO2 equivalents are released in the combustion of fossil 
energy for heating purposes. This represents about 6% of the total Norwegian 
greenhouse gas emissions. An outphasing of the use of oil and fossil fuels for 
heating purposes within 2012 by replacing it with renewable energy and energy 
efficiency measures, will thereby contribute to a considerable reduction of the 
Norwegian CO2 emissions.
Increase the energy efficiency in the transport sector by 30% within 2015
There are many macro-economic measures that can reduce emissions from the 
transport sector:
 Increase the energy efficiency by 30%, including conservation through 
    energy saving driving techniques – eco-driving. Those obtaining a driver’s 
    licence should undergo training in eco-driving, like they do in Sweden.
 Increase the share of transport on foot or by bicycle by 40%
 Increase the market share of the municipal transport system by 50%
 Increase the market share of goods transported by sea by 10% 
 
Bio-energy
Bio-energy is a renewable energy source that does not contribute to climate 
change. Through history, bio-energy has been mankind’s most important 
energy source. Today, polluting, non-renewable energy sources have taken over 
this role. With the dramatic increase in energy consumption and the 
resulting climate change, time has come for taking a renewed interest in 
bio-energy. With its scattered settlements and substantial forest industry, Nor-
way has a great potential for such an undertaking.
Bio-energy is a collective term for energy originating from biological material or 
bio-mass. This encompasses everything from wood products, methane gas from 
landfills, household waste to more processed products such as 
bio-pellets and bio-diesel. 
Throughout history, bio-energy has been the primary heating source and 
bio-energy represents 15% of the energy consumption in the world. In Norway, 
the use of bio-energy represents 5% of the energy consumption. We produce 
15/16 TWh bio-energy annually. The increased forest growth indicates that we 
can produce significant more energy. In comparison, Sweden produces 110TWh. 
They have nearly doubled their bio-energy production since the mid 1990s. 
Bio-energy can be put to use in many ways. It is possible to replace oil heaters 
and electrical heating in buildings by environment-friendly bio-energy. And it is 
possible to drive cars and trucks run on bio-ethanol or bio-diesel.
1% of GNP to climate measures
In the autumn of 2006, the report on climate, made by the former Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank, Sir Nicholas Stern, on 
the authority of the British government, was presented. The report states that 
the climate change will have disastrous consequences for the environment and 
mankind. Furthermore the effects on the world economy will be so dramatic 
that they can be compared with the depression in the 1930ies or the recession 
that came as a consequence of the two world wars. 
Stronger hurricanes and rising sea levels will force people to evacuate. Up to 
200 million people can be displaced as a direct consequence of climate change 
in Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Caribbean islands and big harbour cities such as 
Tokyo, London, New York and Cairo. The melting of glaciers in Himalaya, in the 
Andes mountains and in China will, after a short period of floods, result in a 
severe water shortage affecting 1 out of  6 people in the world. Close to 40% of 
the world’s species can become extinct.
The report estimates that if we continue at the present rate, the climate change 
will have an annual cost of 5 to 20% of the world’s total GNP. The good news and 
the most important conclusion of the report is that it is far less expensive to do 
something about the problem than not to.
According to Stern, emissions reductions towards an acceptable level will have 
an annual cost equal to 1% of the world’s total GNP. For every one of us, that 
implies that all we purchase will become 1% more expensive.
The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair, put it this way: “For every pound 
we invest now, we will save 5 pounds in the future.” Taking mere economic con-
siderations into account, it would be idiotic to continue on the path of increasing 
emissions and devastating climate change.
So let us take Stern seriously. Let us allocate 1% of the GNP for climate mea-
sures. In the case of Norway, this represents NOK 20 billion per year. It will not 
only represent an expenditure, however, it will to a great extent be investments 
for providing us with new industry and new jobs. In other words: An investment 
that will generate new income. 
Many Norwegian parties have as a target that 1% of our Gross National Income 
(GNI) should be allocated for development assistance. And we are nearly there. 
We need a similar objective for climate measures. Norway, the richest country 
in the world, can definitely afford this.
For the allocated funds we can establish a national CO2 fund that is to ensure a 
50% emissions reduction in Norway within 2020 and at least an 80% reduction 
within 2050. Within 2013, such a CO2 fund should ensure investments of 1% of 
the GNP in climate projects in several sectors that reduce emissions and pro-
mote low emission technologies. This could be measures like CO2 management, 
CO2 free energy production, electrification of the continental shelf, deposits for 
the disposal of oil heaters, investments in environment-friendly fuels etc.
WHAT CAN YOU DO?
The main responsibility for cutting emissions lies with the politicians. They can 
impose significant emission reductions on the polluting industry. They also hold 
the authority to facilitate change for making it easier for each and everyone of 
us to reduce our emissions output. It must become more expensive to pollute 
and less expensive to choose an environment-friendly alternative. 
There are a series of specific measures that every single one of us can do in 
our everyday life.
Travel less by car
50% of all travels less than one kilometre are made by car. The potential for 
reducing the number of short trips by car is significant. In this way you save 
both gasoline expenses and the environment.
The buddy system
Two cars put out twice the emission as one. Agree on sharing a ride with 
someone else if possible and you cut the fuel consumption to half. 
Buy an eco-car
With a flexi-fuel car you can fill bio-ethanol when possible, and gasoline when 
you have no access to bio-ethanol. When driving a car run on ethanol you 
reduce the CO2 emissions output of the car by 70-80%. 
Avoid travelling by plane – take the bus or the train 
An airline flight pollutes more than a train journey. Therefore, avoid travelling 
by plane if possible. Travelling by night train saves you valuable working time. 
In addition, when travelling by plane, bear in mind that you must add the travel 
time to and from the airport, the time spent in the check-in queue and the 
time waiting for your luggage into account.
Install a low flow shower head
Normally, this will cut the hot water consumed showering to half.
Install time delay switches
Electrical equipment does not have to be switched on at all times. Time delay 
switches regulates the current input of the electrical article. For instance you 
can program the household heating units to be switched off between midnight 
and 6 am. Or you can make provisions for the water heater to be on standby 
during the night and then switched back on in  time for your morning shower.
Turn down the indoor temperature
For each degree you turn down the indoor temperature you save approximately 
5% of your heating costs. The indoor temperature should be at 19-22°C.
Use energy-saving light bulbs
By replacing 60 Watt light bulb with an 11 Watt energy-saving light bulb you 
can save more than 100kWh per year. If all Norwegian households replaced 5 
ordinary light bulbs with energy saving light bulbs, we would have conserved 
more electricity than two Alta water power plants could provide.
Switch heating solutions
If you have your house heated by oil, paraffin or electricity, you can conserve 
energy by switching to bio-energy or installing a heat pump. You also save 
money, and will have covered the investment cost within a few years. 
In November 2006 the Swedish climate change performance was ranked as 
currently the best in the world by an index developed by Germanwatch, an NGO, 
followed by the United Kingdom and Denmark. Norway was ranked as the 20th 
best1. That said, Sweden as all industrialised countries is still far away from a 
sustainable low carbon society. The following article will give a brief overview 
of the development and most significant features of the Swedish climate policy, 
ending with a look towards the future.
SWEDISH GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
Energy consumption is high in Sweden but due to substantial emission re-
ductions achieved since the early 1970s following the expansion of the hydro and 
nuclear power production as well as a shift away from space heating with fossil 
fuel Sweden’s greenhouse gas emissions per capita compared to other OECD 
countries are low. Thanks to these early efforts, not driven by climate concerns 
but a wish to reduce oil dependency, Sweden’s scope for reducing its green-
house emissions differs from that in many other countries. Given the relatively 
low carbon content in the Swedish power generation it is more expensive to 
make further greenhouse gas reductions in Sweden than elsewhere.
*The author is a research fellow with Potsdam University and member of the SFB 700 collaborative research 
centre. His research is focused on the governance implications of the Clean Development Mechanism in Brazil and 
in EU. friberg@uni-potsdam.de
1Climate Change Performance Index, Germanwatch  http://www.germanwatch.org/ccpi.htm
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Swedish emissions of greenhouse gases vary from year to year, principally due 
to annual differences in temperature and precipitation. If there is ample 
precipitation, hydropower may prove sufficient, but otherwise imports of 
electrical energy are required from energy sources that result in carbon dioxide 
emissions (the alternative is electricity production within Sweden based on 
fossil fuels). How fast the economy is growing also has a significant impact on 
annual emissions. 
      Source: Adapted by author from Swedish Energy Agency data2. 
A factor not included in the two charts are the greenhouse gas emissions 
absorbed or emitted by changes in land use such as forest plantations or clear 
cuts. In 2006 Sweden decided to include Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF) data in its national reporting mandated under the Kyoto 
Protocol. A decision that could potentially make it harder for Sweden to meet 
its Kyoto target as the carbon ‘sink’ of Swedish forests have decreased while 
drained peats have been found to be significant ‘sources’ of nitrous oxide and 
methane, potent greenhouse gases3. 
Greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector amounted to just over 32 
million ton of carbon dioxide equivalents in 2004, which is equivalent to 46 per 
cent of Sweden’s total emissions. In the last 15 years the use of coal has 
decreased whereas the use of biomass, including peat and waste, have more 
than tripled, in 2003 it accounted for 35.6 TWh. The positive trend is principally 
due to energy and carbon dioxide taxes but also to the municipal investment 
grant program for connection to the district heating network. As the expansion 
has principally taken place through increased use of biomass fuels, GHG 
emissions have not increased significantly. 
2 EEA Technical report No 6/2006, Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2004 and inven-
tory report 2006.
3 LAND USE STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING NET GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, A MISTRA supported research 
programme. LUSTRA Annual report 2006. http://www-lustra.slu.se/
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Transport accounts for roughly 40 per cent of Sweden’s emissions of carbon 
dioxide. Two thirds of those emissions derive from passenger transport. 
On average, Swedish citizens travel 44 km per individual per day by various 
modes of transport. Road traffic is the dominating mode for both transport 
of goods and persons. Road traffic accounts for the largest increase in CO2 
emissions since 1990, whereas emissions from civil aviation and railways have 
decreased. The car is the most common mode of transport in Sweden, 
regardless of purpose, and is used for almost 60 per cent of all journeys, 
Sweden has now over four million cars in use – the highest figure ever. A 
further explanation for emissions not decreasing is that the Swedish car fleet 
has become increasingly heavy with larger engines, which has counteracted 
the better fuel economy achieved4. 
Swedish emissions of the basket of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) are projected 
to be one per cent below the 1990 base year levels in 2010. Land use changes 
and forestry are not included in this projection. Compared to Sweden’s 
target of 4 per cent above 1990 levels under the EU burden sharing agreement, 
Sweden is comfortably on track to meet this target. This represents a total of 
approximately 3.6 MtCO2e more than its Kyoto commitment. 
Sweden’s investments in the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol, Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism are estimated to 
amount to 1Mt/year in emission credits. These reductions will be in addition 
to the 3.6 MtCO2e achieved through domestic policies. It is not clear what the 
Swedish government will do with these carbon credits, the civil servant in 
charge is arguing for selling them to the highest bidder among the European 
member states who is not on track to meet their Kyoto commitments. 
ORIGINS OF THE SWEDISH CLIMATE POLICY
The Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament for the first time discussed climate 
change in 1988. It subsequently decided that the government should ascertain 
the impact of energy consumption on carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere and develop a programme for the emissions that nature is 
capable of withstanding. A subsidiary national objective was that ”carbon 
dioxide emissions should not increase above their present level”5. It is worth 
noting that 1988 is the same year the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was founded and that its first chair who stayed in that role for a 
decade was the distinguished Swedish meteorology professor Bert Bolin from 
Stockholm University6.  
4  TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS, YEARBOOK 2005 SWEDISH INSTITUTE FOR TRANSPORT AND COM-
MUNICATIONS ANALYSIS, www.sika-institute.se
5 Gov. Bill 1992/93:179; and Gov. Bill 1996/97:84.
6 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1998 by two UN bodies, the World 
Meterological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to assess the ”risk 
of human-induced climate change”. http://www.ipcc.ch/index.html
Following the release of the first IPCC assessment report 1990 that serve as 
the scientific basis for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) the Swedish Parliament amended the 1988 climate policy 
objective in 1991. The new objective was that emissions of all greenhouse 
gases should be limited in all sectors of society, not just carbon dioxide. 
The 1991 objective involved an action-oriented coherent strategy for reducing 
impact on climate, based on administrative and economic instruments. It was 
also stated that national efforts in this area should enable Sweden, together 
with other Western European countries, to assume a pro-active role in the 
international arena leading up to the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio 1992 where the UNFCCC was agreed upon. 
DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
SWEDISH CLIMATE POLICY
The present Swedish climate strategy is largely based on the climate policy 
decision of 1993 and the energy policy guidelines drawn up in 19977.   The 1993 
climate policy decision was adopted as a national strategy for complying with 
the UNFCCC. The goal was to stabilise emissions of carbon dioxide from the 
burning of fossil fuels in 2000 at their level in 1990 and then reduce them. 
A cost-effective Swedish climate policy was also advocated. In this way, 
economic instruments such as energy and carbon dioxide taxes have come to 
play an important part in national climate policy.
A new Environmental Code came into force on 1 January 1999, bringing together 
15 existing central environmental laws. The aim of the Environmental Code is 
to promote sustainable development based on the understanding that nature is 
worthy of protection in its own right, and that man’s right to exploit nature 
carries with it a responsibility. The Environmental Quality Objective for climate 
was defined as Reduced Climate Impact. This was translated into a long term 
and a short term target. For the period 2008–12, Swedish emissions of the six 
greenhouse gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol should be at least four per cent 
lower than in 1990. The long-term Swedish climate target is based on emissions 
in the longer term being evenly distributed among the world’s population. In 
the long term, the goal of Swedish greenhouse gas emissions should therefore 
be reduced to a level below 4.5 tonnes carbon dioxide equivalents per capita 
per year. The national average for emissions in 2003 was around 7.9 tonnes per 
person. This can be compared to the average in the US that is 19.9 tonnes and 
3.5 tonnes in China8.  According to recent scientific research it is questionable 
though if the Swedish target of 4.5 tonnes that was based on a greenhouse gas 
concentration in the global atmosphere of 550 ppm CO2 equivalent is compatible 
with EU’s and Sweden’s goal of limiting the global average temperature rise to 
7 Gov. Bill 1992/93:179; and Gov. Bill 1996/97:84. 
8 Source: CAIT http://cait.wri.org. Measured in tonnes carbon dioxide equivalents per capita per year, not including 
emissions from land use change. 
no more than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels9. 
The Swedish short term target is more ambitious than what Sweden agreed to 
within the EU Kyoto burden sharing agreement level of plus 4 percent GHGs, 
compared to the base year 1990. While not officially acknowledged, it is likely 
that the planned decommissioning of the Swedish nuclear power plants was a 
factor taken into consideration when the EU burden sharing target of plus 4 
per cent was agreed upon. Sweden is today one of few EU-15 countries on track 
to meet its obligation under the burden sharing agreement according to the 
European Environment Agency10. 
In order to achieve these reductions a number of programmes, initiatives, 
new laws and changes of regulations have been implemented over the last 15  
years. According to the third national communication to the UNFCCC Sweden’s 
most significant climate policies are focusing on the areas of: taxation, 
regulation, fiscal incentives, information efforts and voluntary agreements.
Taxation
Increased taxes on energy and carbon dioxide have for many years played an 
important role in Sweden, both as a fiscal tax source and as a policy 
instrument. The Swedish energy tax system was reformed in 1991. During the 
1980s much focus had been on oil substitution and the tax system was 
therefore designed to discourage oil use. The reformed taxation system was 
based on a carbon tax and an energy tax on fuels, the latter not directly 
connected to the carbon content of the fuel. Simultaneously as the carbon tax 
was introduced general energy taxes was reduced by 50 per cent. The tax level 
was set to 365 Swedish Crowns (SEK)/kg of CO2 released, much higher than the 
cost of carbon emission credits in the EU Emission trading system. Since then 
the system and the tax level has changed several times but a common feature 
is lower taxes for industry and electricity production than for consumers. The 
most obvious effect of the reformed taxation system has been the expansion of 
biomass use in the district heating system.
Regulation
From January 2005, Swedish industrial installations included in the EU 
Emission Trading System´s (EU ETS) trading scheme must have a special per-
mit to emit carbon dioxide and nobody is allocated emission allowances without 
such a permit. The EU ETS regulations have been applied in Sweden through 
the Emissions Trading Act and the Emissions Trading Ordinance11. One of the 
important impacts of the law was that all the covered industries became fully 
9 Meinhausen, Malte (2006) What Does a 2°C Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis 
Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates In: Avoiding Dan-
gerous Climate Change (ed. Schellnhuber, H J), pp 265-280. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
10 http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/newsreleases/ghgtrends2006-en 
11  EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC;  Emissions Trading Act, 2004:1199, Lag om handel med utsläppsrätter; and the 
Emissions Trading Ordinance 2004:1205, Förordning om handel med utsläppsrätter.
exempt from the Swedish carbon dioxide tax. Given that the EU ETS is an 
environmental/energy legislation of unprecedented width and complexity 
covering more than 12.000 installations in all of EU representing about half of 
the EU CO2 emissions, it is still too early to evaluate if the trading system will 
be successful in curbing industry’s carbon dioxide emissions. Other significant 
regulatory measures are the Electricity Certificate System aimed at increas-
ing the proportion of renewable electricity generation and energy efficiency 
regulations.
Fiscal incentives 
Fiscal incentives are one of the hallmarks of the Swedish climate policy, 
supporting wanted action and making it costlier to carry on unwanted beha-
viour. One of the most successful examples of this approach was the 1996 
initiated Local Investment Programmes (LIP) that in 2003 was replaced by 
the Climate Investment Programmes (Klimp). These programmes have so far 
awarded 1,127 million SEK leveraging total investments of more than 30 billion 
SEK by local authorities, administrative regions and companies. 258 invest-
ment programmes in more than half of Sweden’s municipalities, more than 
2,200 projects in total. Applications are granted for the sectors that have the 
largest impact on reducing greenhouse gases. Such as expansions of district 
heating systems, anaerobic digestion of waste to produce biogas, support for 
transition to biofuels, energy efficiency measures and local information about 
the climate issue.  
Information efforts
As in many other countries climate change information campaign to raise 
awareness and profile of climate change, has also been a part of the Swedish 
climate policy. Including supporting such efforts by civil society such as Kli-
matkampen; a competition among high schools12.  
Voluntary agreements
The most significant voluntary agreement in the climate area is the European 
car manufacturers’ 1998 agreement with the EU Commission. In order to 
avoid legislations the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) 
agreed with the European Commission an average emissions target of 140g of 
CO2 per kilometre for new cars by 2008, a pledge that the car industry with all 
likelihood is failing to meet13.
Transport policies
In September 2001 the Swedish government decided to put a transport invest-
ment bill before parliament infrastructure for a sustainable transport 
12 http://www.klimatkampen.se/
13 Car makers ’failing’ on climate, BBC News 20 April 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4922614.
stm
system14. This bill represents the largest investment in Swedish infrastructure 
in modern times. 364 billion SEK will be allocated for this purpose between 
2004 and 2015 to develop and modernise transport systems and to take the 
necessary steps to maintain and safeguard the existing rail network and the 
137,000 km of public highways. The package includes some important improve-
ments on the rail capacity that expand the high-speed rail traffic.
Following the example of London, Stockholm is in the process of introducing 
congestion charging combined with extended public transport for the 
capital. The system was introduced on trial basis between 22 August 2005 and 
31 July 2006, followed by a local referendum on its continuation. The referen-
dum was somewhat inconclusive as the city voted for its continuation whereas 
the surrounding municipalities who staged their own referendums mainly 
where against the system. The trial was closely evaluated from a number of 
different perspectives and most of them came to the conclusion that the conge-
stion charges had been successful and the system is set to be reintroduced.
Adaptation policies
In Sweden adverse impacts of climate change was for a long time seen as 
mainly being a concern for developing countries, this all changed after Gudrun 
came to visit. During the weekend of 8-9 January 2005 a storm with close to un-
precedented hurricane-force winds hit Sweden. The storm was named Gudrun. 
In one night some 75 million cubic metres of forest was blown down, destroyed 
or damaged, several times 
the national annual log-
ging rate. Infrastructure 
sustained damage from 
fallen trees and directly 
from the hurricane-force 
winds. Electricity supplies 
were knocked out for up 
to 730,000 customers. 
Telephone lines were 
cut. People were isola-
ted and several people 
were killed, both during 
the storm and during the 
forest clearing and power 
line reconstruction. Many 
experts regard Gudrun as 
the worst natural disaster 
ever to hit Sweden. 
14 Gov Bill 2001/ 02:20 Infrastruktur för ett långsiktigt hållbart transportsystem.
Flooding Scenario for Karlstad city centre 
Source: Adaptation and Vulnerability Inquiry Presentation
According to climate scenarios build on some of the scenarios used by the 
IPCC Sweden’s annual mean temperature will increase by between 2.5 and 
4.5°C. The length of the vegetation period is estimated to increase by between 
one and two months and in the far south by up to three months. Precipitation 
is expected to increase by between 5 and 25% over the next century, with the 
greatest increase occurring in northern Sweden during the winter. It is anti-
cipated that the ecological impacts will be substantial. In June 2005 a climate 
and vulnerability inquiry committee was established to identify how Swedish 
society can prepare for future climate change. It will focus on infrastructure, 
estimating cost of potential damage and what can be done to adapt. The in-
quiry will give its recommendations in October 200715. 
Sweden’s International climate policy
In addition to the climate policies that Sweden are implementing as part of 
the EU, such as the system for emission trading, Sweden is also significantly 
engaged as a donor to a number of international activities and initiatives. The 
overall aim of Sweden’s development assistance policy is to combat poverty. 
Mitigation and adapting to adverse impacts from climate change is therefore 
seen as an integral part of this overall aim. Swedish development assistance 
as it relates to climate change is intended to contribute to measures that 
prevent or minimise greenhouse gas emissions, reduce the vulnerability of 
poor countries and people to climate change and put them in a better position 
to adapt to a changed climate. Around a third of Sweden’s climate-related 
development assistance is channelled via multilateral organisations, prima-
rily the Global Environment Facility (GEF) where Sweden contributed a total 
of 764.67 million SEK for the period 2002-200616. Sweden also contributed to 
the funds created by the Kyoto Protocol such as the ‘Fund for least developed 
countries’ (3 million SEK) and to the ‘Special Climate Change Fund’ (10 million 
SEK). Sweden also provides financial support to the World Bank’s consultancy 
funds, regional development banks and the UN Environmental Programme17.
15 Climate and vulnerability inquiry committee http://www.sou.gov.se/klimatsarbarhet/index.htm
16  REPORT ON THE FUNDING STATUS OF THE GEF TRUST FUND AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, 
www.gefweb.org It should be noted that the GEF does not focus only on climate change but also work on Biodi-
ver-sity, International Waters, Land Degradation, The Ozone Layer and Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs).
17  The 4th Swedish National communication to the UNFCCC; http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/05/47/61/
fbc570e8.pdf
In 2006 the Swedish Parliament adopted a new climate policy bill18. In this bill, 
the government stated the aim that Sweden’s emissions in 2020 should be 
25 per cent lower than 1990 emissions. In the national election in September 
2006 Sweden for the first time in over a decade had a change of power, a four 
party Centre-Right coalition won, replacing the social democratic party that 
has shaped most of the Swedish climate policy. In a an opinion piece published 
in Dagens Nyheter the ‘new’ Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt (Conservative 
Party) and Environment Minister Andreas Carlgren (Centre Party) outlined 
that the main features of the climate policy would continue and they gave their 
support for a future ambitious EU climate policy. They also stated support for 
the proposal for an EU 30 per cent GHG reduction target for 2020 that UK, Ger-
many and France have suggested, restating the Swedish ambition of a 25 
per cent greenhouse gas reduction by 2020 compared to 199019.  Exactly how 
Sweden (and the EU) will reach these higher reduction targets is yet unclear. 
A closely related initiative trying to answer some of these questions that recei-
ved a lot of international attention was the creation of the Swedish ‘oil com-
mission’ in December 2005. Made up by eight leading representatives from 
academia, government and industry chaired by the then Prime minister Göran 
Persson and using many external experts it tried to find ways how to decrease 
Sweden’s oil dependency by 2020. Its recommendations where that through 
a combination of increased use of renewable energy, especially biofuels, and 
energy efficiency combined with a stronger role for the EU Emission Trading 
system Sweden could substantially reduce its use of oil and at the same time 
decrease its greenhouse gas emissions20. 
Sweden will chair the EU presidency in the second half of 2009. Given that 
this presidency role will probably coincide with critical negotiations on the 
post-2012 negotiations in the UNFCCC, Sweden will have a very important role 
to play. One of the preparatory efforts that Sweden is already involved in has 
been the engagement and funding of a series of informal meetings of climate 
negotiators and environment ministers. The first such meeting took place on 
Greenland in 2005, followed in 2006 by a meeting in South Africa. A third one 
hosted by Sweden is scheduled for the summer of 2007 in Lappland. 
In many ways 2006 was a tipping point for the climate change issue in Sweden. 
The issue received massive amounts of media coverage, helped by the fact that 
the last six months of 2006 where the warmest on meteorological record. 
18  Gov Bill 2005/06:172, National climate policy in global cooperation.
19 Fredrik Reinfeldt & Andreas Carlgren, Utsläppen av växthusgaser ska minska med 30 procent. Dagens 
Nyheter, December 18, 2006.
20 På väg mot ett OLJEFRITT Sverige, Kommisjonen mot oljeberoende, juni 2006,
 http:77www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/06/62/80/bf5c673c.pdf
FUTURE OF SWEDISH CLIMATE POLICY
While Swedes in general might not mind a bit warmer summers, the lack of 
winter and ‘unnaturally’ high temperatures on Christmas Eve to many brought 
home the message that something is seriously wrong with our climate and 
that it is urgent to do something about it. Thanks to a combination of good con-
ditions and successful policies Sweden has shown that it is possible to 
reduce ones greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining economic growth. 
The reductions achieved so far not demanded any significant changes of be-
haviour. It is clear that if Sweden is to achieve its part of the drastic reductions 
needed to keep global climate change in check, this will have to include some 
mayor changes to the way we live, travel, consume and produce. Is the Swe-
dish consensus model able to deliver these necessary changes?
  
Climate chan-
ges have lead to 
deforestation and 
desertification in 
many places. In 
Machakos in Kenya 
(pictured) trees are 
being planted to bind 
the soil and hold the 
rain water.
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By Harald Gundersen and Hans-Jürgen Schorre
THE ENVIRONMENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
OF THE CHURCH OF NORWAY
The starting point
”And God said; «See, I have given you every plant producing seed, on the face of all the 
earth, and every tree which has fruit producing seed: they will be for your food.  And 
to every beast of the earth and to every bird of the air and every living thing moving on 
the face of the earth I have given every green plant for food: and it was so. And God saw 
everything which he had made and it was very good.  And there was evening and there 
was morning, the sixth day. “
                                                                                                            Genesis 1, 29 - 31
The administrative responsibility - the responsibility of managing the Creation 
of God as a source of life – has always been a central part of Christian under-
standing. The view upon nature as a God-given gift from the Creator, to give 
joy and life to the humans, and something to be managed and not consumed 
– and thereafter to be passed on to new generations, is a point of view that has 
been characteristic for  the Christian teachings. The involvement of the Church 
in environment issues has therefore a somewhat different anchorage than 
traditional environmental protection. As a central part of theology, it is the 
basis of both Christian teachings and ethics. It is also important to add that in 
regards to this point there has been a big discrepancy between the life of the 
Church and the teachings of the Church.
HISTORY AND STATEMENTS
In many ways the awareness in society in regards to environment and distribution 
issues is reflected in the awareness of the Church. However, the Church has often 
addressed these kinds of issues at an early stage. In 1969, the Bishops’ 
Conference passed a statement titled “Pollution of Nature and Everyday Life”. 
Here, specific environmental problems were mentioned, that “appeals to the 
conscience of the individual. But at the same time, it is about a social problem 
of an alarming magnitude. It can be solved only through considerable efforts by 
society. If this challenge is to be met effectively, this will imply a slowing-down in 
the growth of our wealth. However, this is a sacrifice that we as a people – and as 
a civilisation – will have to make. Our belief in God as creator, gives human beings 
a holy obligation to take care of his creation. And the fundamental commandment 
“You shall not steal” prohibits us to exhaust the resources that rightfully belong to 
our children and grandchildren.” (Minutes, Bishops’ Conference 1969.)
20 years later, and in the light of the Brundtland Commission, the 1989 General 
Synod followed up with the declaration “Protection of Life”. “As a society, we must 
act on the assumption that the experts’ gloomiest prediction for the moment of 
the ecological breakdown may prove to be correct. If we choose less radical solu-
tions, we run a life threatening risk.”
In 1992 the report “The Consumer Society as an Ethical Challenge” was presented 
at the Bishops’ Conference. The Bishops’ Conference passed an extensive state-
ment on the subject, and both the report and the statement attracted attention 
from the Church as well as from the political environment and from the industry. 
Simultaneous to the declarations made by the Church of Norway, the ecumenical 
organisations were planning a more specific work within this area. As early as 
1983, the World Council of Churches (WCC - Kirkenes Verdensråd, KV) adopted a 
specific focus on  the work with  ”Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation” (JPIC) 
at the General Assembly in Vancouver, which was four years prior to the 
Brundtland Commission’s presentation of Our Common Future to the United 
Nations. Researcher Oluf Langelle at the International Research Institute of 
Stavanger AS (Rogalandsforskning), who holds a doctorate in “sustainable 
development”, is of the opinion that the term sustainable development was used 
for the first time in this ecclesiastical work. 
Already before the JPIC got started, the World Council of Churches had been 
through a period of consolidation with the programme Just, Participatory and 
Sustainable Society (JPSS). Between the sixth (1983) and the seventh (1991) Ge-
neral Assembly the WCC challenged its member churches to give statements and 
carry out common actions in order to oppose the threat to all life – human beings 
and nature, as part of the essence of what being a Church entails. After 1991, as a 
follow-up of the JPIC, the WCC has carried out 22 studies from all over the world 
in relation to the programme “Theology of Life” (TOL).
Climate changes have lead to unpredictable weather in 
Kenya. Everybody in the local community in Utooni takes 
part in the voluntary construction of dams. The sand dams 
work as water reservoirs, providing safety for people and 
animals when there is no rain.
Photo: Norwegian Church Aid/Hege Opseth
Water is a condition for life. The people in 
Utooni get clean water from the sand dams 
they have constructed. This very old method 
for water conservation has been put to use.   
Photo: Norwegian Church Aid/Hege Opseth
All these programmes have been carried out in such a way that sought to challenge 
the member churches to assume more responsibility in regards to justice, peace and 
Creation. Even though the distance between the WCC and the Norwegian congregations 
is big, the national councils of the Church of Norway have contributed to the anchoring 
and nourishing of this involvement in Norway.
CONSUMPTION AND JUSTICE
The 1996 General Synod addressed the issue “Consumption and Justice” and formula-
ted the resolution as a liturgical greeting in the form of a letter:
The General Synod greets all congregations and councils in the Church of Norway and 
everyone of good will! 
The resolution was sent to all the congregations of the Church of Norway and the last 
point of its resolution the General Synod called upon all levels of the Church:
The General Synod encourages the staff and boards at all levels in the Church of Nor-
way, national, diocesan and local, to implement the challenges as described in the let-
ter. Concrete objectives should be formulated for all aspects of the work in the Church, 
related to the nine mentioned challenges, and there should be regular reporting to 
evaluate the progress.
The resolution of 1996 rings the bells three by three times for change, action and hope 
and lists up nine issues for specific action in the years to come: the use of church funds, 
a labelling system for fair trade, resource awareness, the use of time and money, the 
human dimension within the consumption culture, issues related to indigenous people, 
debt cancellation for the poorest countries, climate issues and green tax.
In many ways this resolution was the start of an extensive work at the central level, 
at the diocese level and in many congregations. It is sensational that this involvement 
has been unanimously confirmed and further developed by three General Synods, 
each synod composed of a new group of people. Thus, the Church of Norway 
presented a most welcome unanimity cross cutting all other potential division lines 
within the Church.
Five years later, in 2001, the General Synod after a comprehensive evaluation of the 
work so far renewed their discussion of the issue. In the 2001 General Synod 
resolution, the following statement was made: “The vision must be to make the 
Church the world’s largest environmental movement” and that the thematic issue  
“Consumption and Justice” concerns the entire congregation. After this General 
Synod the first resource groups at the diocese level were established. It was noticed 
that the environmental involvement was very pronounced in the accomplished work.
The 2003 General Synod also had consumption and justice on the agenda; this time 
as item12/03 Protecting the Sea, a project rooted in the work of the Church for the 
environment and for “consumption and justice”. The background for this work and for 
a resolution concerning the management of one of our northernmost sea areas 
especially with a particular emphasis on the management of fisheries, the fish 
farming business and the oil exploration was a North Sea Sailing Seminar carried out 
in collaboration with the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople in connection with 
the General Assembly of the Conference of European Churches in the summer of that 
year. The fact that the General Synod at that time adopted a resolution for the intro-
duction of a celebration of the ”Creation Day” as an integral part of the ecclesiastical 
year, may in the future become one of the most important contributions of the Church 
for a frequent reminder of our God-given administrative responsibility. Symbolically 
speaking, the issue was also important since it demonstrated that the work for the 
environment had become the most prominent issue within the area of “consumption 
and justice”.
Prior to the General Synod in Bodø in 2004 a strategy gathering for all the resource 
groups at the diocese level was carried out at Kjerringøy outside Bodø. Many of the 
church leaders and representatives from the Christian Council of Norway were also 
present. This strategy gathering adopted a common platform for the work, and in 
addition a national resource group was to be established to coordinate the work 
centrally. This gathering has been followed up with annual inspiration gatherings in 
addition to functioning as a useful arena for the regional resource groups.
The single issue within the area of consumption and justice that has had the most 
work done during the years that this work has existed, is undoubtedly “green 
congregations” – efforts to motivate the local level of the Church, the congregations, 
in addition to developing tools for their environmental involvement. This issue has 
partly been present from the start as an important part of the involvement of key 
persons, and partly it has escalated as a result of project support from the depart-
ment of the environment. 
This support has made it possible to employ a national coordinator in a 50% job 
position, to develop and update the internet websites in addition to sending out regular 
newsletters. 
This job position has also made it possible to make an even greater effort to provide 
environmental certification for different institutions and congregations within the 
Church. Separate criteria for congregations, common parish councils, and 
cemeteries have been developed in collaboration with The Foundation Eco-Light-
house Program and Green Living. This certification system imposes stricter 
requirements to the activities than the “green congregation” does, imply a certi-
fication by an independent third party and in addition it has economic costs. As a 
starting point, it may be most realistic to recommend it to major establishments. 
A new version for the guideline ”Our green congregation” containing concrete 
choices of action in regards to service, diaconal work, education, information, pur-
chase, energy, transports and waste management makes it possible for the congre-
gation to start a similar process with less costs and less obligations. The Norwegian 
Church Aid makes use of such a guideline in connection with the Lenten Campaign 
2007, with the challenge to the congregation; become a green congregation.
The emphasis on the environment issue has influenced the consumption and justice 
work in the Church of Norway over the past few years, in spite of a very broad plat-
form which includes everything from economic injustice and debt relief to issues 
concerning indigenous peoples and integration of refugees and asylum seekers.
It is worth mentioning that this work has also picked up impulses from parts of our 
own Church. Within the work of the Sámi Church Council (Samisk Kirkeråd) the 
approach to the climate and environment issue has been somewhat different from 
the traditional anthropocentrically one. In the Sami understanding of Christianity, 
Nature and Creation has a special value in itself. While in the classical 
Christianity it has been stated that man through the administrative responsibility is 
totally superior to nature, the Sámi tradition has to a greater extent had a deep 
respect for nature’s intrinsic value. These impulses to the environmental 
involvement of the Church are not reserved for the Sámi alone, but something that 
indigenous peoples all over the world are becoming spokespeople for. 
This perspective constitutes an important corrective to the classical point of view, 
where man alone is superior to the Creation as such.
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE BISHOPS
The ones who for many years, to a great extent, have sustained this involvement 
personally as well as on behalf of the Church of Norway, are undoubtedly several 
of the bishops. Not only have they been symbol bearers for an important cause in 
the capacity of their roles, but they have also managed to put several issues on the 
agenda.
The first one to become involved was perhaps the bishop of the diocese of Møre, 
Odd Bondevik. Not only has he, on several occasions, expressed his critical 
viewpoints in regards to gas power plants, but he has also been an advocate for 
the protection of the environment in general, within the Church as well as for the 
rest of the society in general. 
The Bishop of the diocese of Bjørgvin, Ole D. Hagesæther, has also thrown him-
self into the environmental movement. Pushed forward by a very active resource 
group, he has managed to put high velocity trains on the agenda. Calculations 
show that it is possible to establish a high velocity railway across Haukelifjell 
mountain that can transport passengers from Oslo to Bergen or Stavanger in 
three hours. A high velocity railway would not defer a noticeable amount of 
travellers away from the Bergen railway since only 20 % of the passengers travel 
between Oslo and Bergen. However, it would compete effectively with the flights 
Oslo – Bergen and Oslo – Stavanger and thus prove to be an environment-friendly 
and competitive 
alternative.
Moreover, the Bishop of the diocese of Nidaros, Finn Wagle, has for a long time 
been eager to introduce a liturgy which includes the whole Creation. His Norwe-
gian “Hustavle”; the precept “The cry from a wounded planet” is a good example 
of a hymnic language speaking to the heart and not only to the mind: The Norwe-
gian “Hustavle” has also gained much sympathy and appreciation in non-ecclesi-
astical environments. His approach deals with the need of the Church to include 
protection of the environment into the “ecclesiastical language” and in the ongo-
ing service reform taking place in the Church of Norway. Several bishops could 
be mentioned. There is hardly one of them that hasn’t distinguished themselves 
through initiatives or other engagements that concern protecting Creation and 
warning against the dangers of a greedy consumption culture.
To sum it up, this has an inestimable value when it comes to lifting the Church up 
towards the vision of “making the Church what it in being is – the world’s big-
gest organisation for the protection of the environment (Martin Lønnebo – former 
bishop of the Church of Sweden).
THE BREAK-THROUGH
It is no exaggeration to say that the environmental involvement of the Church 
of Norway has mainly been carried on by the “consumption and justice envi-
ronment” with its resource groups and key persons at the central and regional 
level. Even though there are several examples from the congregations where the 
environmental involvement has blossomed, there has been limited success with 
making the protection of Creation an integral part of the congregations’ self-un-
derstanding in regards to what it means to be a Church. To en even lesser extent 
one has succeeded in manifesting the fight to save the environment in the diffe-
rent activities of the congregations – except for little things such as the recycling 
of paper etc. 
An objection made by some people concerning the work of the Church within 
this area – and that might be an explanation for the lack of break-through in 
the congregations – has been  that the involvement is too focused on the alter-
natives for change in the life style and the life patterns of the individual. There 
is nothing wrong in appealing to the people to go by bicycle instead of by car, or 
to save energy by changing to energy-saving light bulbs and pellet stoves, but 
when the individual alternatives for action are over-communicated compared to 
the collective responsibility (the authorities) for facilitating choices for environment-
friendly alternatives, then the main responsibility is placed on the individual, and not on 
the collective solutions. This may be one of the reasons why the environmental involve-
ment is considered to be something unique and alternative – within the Church as well 
as within the environmental movement in general. Others will point out other reasons: 
a too heavy work load combined with an insufficient amount of dedicated employees re-
sult in strict priority lists within the congregations. They are not able to follow through 
on all of their ambitions within this area even though they may be excellent ambitions.
Another essential component is that change takes time. We are talking about big chan-
ges in attitudes. With this perspective much has happened in a relatively short period of 
time. Not the least, in connection with all the extensive reforms taking place within the 
Church has this perspective been taken care of: 
 In the reform of religious education where children and young people become 
acquainted with the values of the Church. Several local projects have environment, 
consumption and justice as central elements in their work, and the steering committee 
for reform especially asks for this focus in the advertising of funds for new projects.
 A new guideline for diaconal work in the Church of Norway is currently under de-
velopment. The draft of the new guideline has a revised formulation for the definition 
of diaconia to include the protection of Creation as an essential part of the diaconal 
responsibility of the Church.
 In the autumn of 2006 the General Synod, for the first time, adopted a communication 
platform for the Church of Norway. Transparency, presence and hope, in addition to 
forsaking, shall become core values in all ecclesiastical communication. This is an ex-
pression for the wish that an awareness for the necessity of a sustainable management 
must be reflected in all ecclesiastical communication. 
 Finally, the strategic plan of the Church of Norway for 2005-2008 has this perspective 
included in the main objectives as well as in the underlying objectives.
Perhaps in the long run this integration of the perspective in the central steering 
documents will be one of the most important components in regards to establishing 
durable, sustainable organisational and societal structures.
There is reason to point out that – in regards to this issue, we at present most proba-
bly are witnessing a shift within the congregations of the Church of Norway. A series 
of incidents this past year with extensive media coverage has made the grassroots of 
the Church aware of the existing climate threat. The Church of Norway has been given 
the opportunity to facilitate for, and show their extensive environmental involvement. 
Through the United Nations World Environment Day in Tromsø with a televised service 
and a liturgy that will be dispersed to all churches in the country, as well as to the 
Lenten Campaign of the Norwegian Church Aid in most congregations in the country, 
with a focus on the environmental challenges in the south, the members of the Church 
will to a greater extent obtain a natural arena where they can engage themselves in the 
environment movement and the climate issues.
It is also very pleasing to see that things are starting to happen in the Free 
Churches of Norway. The Christian Council of Norway (Norges Kristne Råd 
– NKR) will, at its meeting in March of this year addresses the challenges from 
the work with “consumption and justice” and focus on the environment. Our 
hope is that more church communities will throw themselves into the fight for 
the protection of Creation.
On February 6th of this year, the Church of Norway Council of Ecumenical and 
International Relations (Mellomkirkelig Råd for Den norske kirke – MKR) gave a 
statement in connection with the IPCC report (see appendix). In this statement 
MKR points out that while every one of us must forsake some things in our life 
for the sake of Creation, the politicians must to a much greater extent take 
action on behalf of the collective society. The challenge for the prophetic voice 
of the Church in regards to the climate issue from now onwards will be whether 
or not the Church will be able to manage these two components simultaneously. 
Then the Church – standing tall - will be the voice bringing a different and
important contribution into the debate.
APPENDIX
On the occasion of the United Nations Panel Climate publishing its report, the 
Church of Norway Council of Ecumenical and International Relations (Mellom-
kirkelig Råd for Den norske kirke – MKR) convened in Oslo on February 6th, 
2007, gave the following declaration:
THE GOVERNMENT MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY ON OUR 
BEHALF – ALL OF US MUST FORSAKE SOMETHING 
Sons and daughters of the Earth,you know good and evil:
Life is in danger! Show that you care! 
 Bishop Finn Wagle,”Hustavle – the cry from a wounded planet”
1. We must show our responsibility worthy as fellow human beings.
We are all caretakers of God’s Creation. This concerns humanity’s greatness 
and responsibility. We know that God’s Creation is threatened by climate chan-
ge as a result of our emissions. The Bible speaks of God’s covenant with all of 
humanity and all living creatures -”that is with you, for perpetual generations” 
(Genesis 9). In the good Norwegian farm tradition the land will be passed on 
to the next generation in such a condition that they also will be able to make a 
living of it. It is difficult to relate to generations that are as yet unborn. But, we 
must show our responsibility worthy as fellow human beings. 
The climate change will hit the poor first and hardest. Already now, the climate 
change is responsible for the loss of human lives. Several animal and plant 
species are at risk for becoming extinct. Protection of the environment must 
be given the same priority as conflict resolution, poverty and the spread of 
deadly weapons - issues that are commonly found on the political agenda. The 
Church of Norway would like to emphasize that the protection of the environ-
ment deals with how we practice justice, charity and our love to the world that 
God loves. As part of the worldwide Christian community we would like to em-
phasize that this responsibility is a global responsibility. This implies that we 
in Norway must not only ask how we best can fend for ourselves, but show that 
we take our global responsibility seriously. This is about our common future on 
our common earth.
2. We must forsake for life’s sake. 
We must forsake if we are to be able to do something about the climate 
change, we must forsake if this earth shall become a good place to live for 
those who are living in areas that are already devastated. We must forsake if 
we and our future descendants shall have a good life on this earth. The climate 
change will either way have a heavy cost. To counteract the climate change 
will also have a heavy cost on individuals and on the community. But it will 
have an even higher cost if we do not act now. When we forsake, we forsake for 
the sake of life. And much of what we can do, can improve our quality of life. 
3. The government must assume responsibility on our behalf and de-
mand our responsibility.
The Church asks the government to implement necessary actions in order to 
save an endangered earth, even if it is costly. The Norwegian government must 
be able to make demands in regards to the economic life and the citizens, the 
way it is done when it comes to securing the defence of the country and its 
inhabitants. It is no less valid when it comes to the defence of the earth and 
the future generations. The situation requires a will to find broad solutions 
cross cutting political parties and country borders. The politicians within all 
professions, at the local and national level, must now take big and important 
measures on behalf of all of us. Interests that in the short term may stand to 
loose something must not have the final word in this connection. Responsible 
politicians must obtain the support of the Church and the people in order to 
support demanding and unpopular actions. Every week the Church prays for 
all who hold responsibility in society. There is no less need now when faced 
with these demanding challenges.
 
4. Norway must assume responsibility for their own emissions - we 
can not just pay our way out of the environmental problems.
The government must as soon as possible decide on how we in Norway intend 
to reduce our emissions substantially. This must apply for the economic life, 
the public life as well as for the individual. Although it is important to con-
tribute to the reduction of emissions in other countries, it is not enough.  We 
can not pay our way out of our own responsibility for reductions, neither as a 
nation nor as individuals. 
Norway has a special responsibility in facing the climate change, for several 
reasons. Norway is one of the countries with the highest CO2 emission per in-
habitant in the world. A big part of our material prosperity is based on the sale 
of fossil fuels. Norway has both the economy and the opportunity for making 
big adjustments themselves and for contributing to the technological breakt-
hroughs that others can make use of as well. The government must show how 
Norway – through technology transmission, projects and actions - will take an 
international responsibility for the contribution to the reduction of emissions 
in other countries. For a major difference to occur, it is not enough to focus 
on the responsibility of the individual - although very important. We must set 
ambitious, concrete and time specific targets in order to counteract the cli-
mate change and the consequences thereof. That is why the targets we set for 
ourselves for 2020 are so essential. The objectives must be set so far in to the 
future to obtain a satisfactory long term perspective and at the same time be 
so near in time that they require immediate action. International agreements 
like the Kyoto protocol must be followed up, but even it is just a start.
5. What the Church expects.
Church of Norway expects the government and the political environment to 
join forces now on the task of showing how Norway will face and counteract 
the climate change, both in this country as well as in the rest of the world. 
Now is not the time for quibbles and internal disagreements. The Church 
expects a thorough and objective oriented work towards an ambitious state-
ment on our contribution to the CO2 emission reduction in our country as well 
as on a global basis. The Church expects the economic sector to assume their 
responsibility and adjust their activities and investments accordingly based 
on our current knowledge of climate change. We expect that a great amount 
of effort and creativity will be put into developing new technological solutions 
and new products that can contribute to a reduction in the total CO2 emis-
sions. The Church expects the Norwegian people to come together and make 
a united effort for our earth, our fellow human beings and for our descendants 
- to great joy for us all. 
Human-induced climate changes are threatening development for millions 
of the world’s poorest. Emissions from fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal) in rich, 
industrialised countries are leading to global warming that is destroying the 
basis of life for poor people in the developing world. The consequences of 
climate changes are currently dramatic. More extreme weather conditions 
and the increased frequency of droughts, floods and other disasters contribute 
to reduced food and water security, the increased spread of diseases, more 
climate refugees, and a struggle for ever more scant resources. The fight 
against poverty and the reduction and handling of climate change are 
irrevocably intertwined.
Those who currently emit the least greenhouse gases are those who are most 
affected by climate changes. Poor countries have less resources and a weaker 
ability to adapt and are therefore more vulnerable. Rich countries must bear the 
main responsibility for reducing and dealing with greenhouse gas emissions. 
As one of the world’s richest countries with high and increasing emission levels 
and a substantial oil and gas sector, Norway has a particular responsibility. 
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By Norweian Church Aid
The recommendations of the UN panel on climate change (IPCC) are clear: 
In order to avoid irreversible climate changes we need to reduce the world’s 
total emissions of greenhouse gases by approximately 80 per cent in the 
course of a few decades. This requires global solutions and immediate action. 
The Kyoto Protocol is the international framework for limiting the emissions 
of greenhouse gases in wealthy countries, but the agreement has number of 
weaknesses, inter alia that the permitted emission levels are high. In addition it 
is unclear as to how much of the emission reductions that are to be taken 
nationally. Also, the world’s largest source of greenhouse gases, the United 
States, has not even ratified the agreement. Another challenge is supplying 
energy to poor people in order to promote development without this leading to 
further climate change that in turn worsens their living conditions. Increased 
consumption in poor countries must therefore be combined with reduced 
consumption in rich countries. Additionally, the rich countries must take 
responsibility for investing in renewable energy sources and for ensuring that 
developing countries also benefit from climate-friendly technology.
NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID IS OF THE OPINION THAT: 
   Norway must immediately reduce its own emissions of greenhouse gases. 
At least half of Norway’s emission obligations in the Kyoto Protocol must be 
implemented nationally. Norway must further actively work towards a more 
comprehensive and ambitious international climate convention where global 
climate instruments for international air and sea transport are included in the 
agreement framework. 
   Norway must work to provide the poor with access to energy because this is 
a prerequisite for development. The government should also to an increasing 
degree facilitate the development of climate-friendly technology that developing 
countries may benefit from. Norway should further contribute to the establish-
ment of a global fund with the purpose of alleviating the consequences of high 
oil prices in developing countries and assist developing countries to become 
less dependent on carbon-intensive energy. At the same time Norway must 
not promote policies that deny poor countries the opportunity to use the same 
technology that is available to industrialised countries. 
   Climate changes must become a priority of Norwegian aid and development 
policies, and climate adjustment must become an integrated part of aid 
policies. Norway must intensify efforts to strengthen natural resource manage-
ment in developing countries. Securing the rights of the poor and their access 
to natural resources is central because this is a prerequisite for reducing their 
vulnerability to climate change.
   Developing countries also have an independent responsibility for ensuring 
that economic growth does not preclude sustainable development. In the work 
with a new international climate agreement, developing countries with rapidly 
growing economies should therefore commit themselves to reducing the growth 
of their greenhouse gas emissions. Norway and other rich countries must 
assist developing countries with expertise and capacity building that supports 
the participation in, ratification of and implementation of international climate 
agreements. Increased support for capacity building in civilian societies is 
essential. 
   Active and targeted work must be carried out to ensure that individuals as 
well as organisations and businesses are provided with a better foundation 
and incentives to change consumption patterns. Focusing on technology will 
be important, but the climate threat also requires a switch to more sustainable 
consumption patterns.
Both droughts and floods are a problem for the access to clean water. 
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REDUCE EMISSIONS IN SWEDEN 
WITH 40 PER CENT BY 2020 
– AND FINANCE THE SAME 
AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Views by Church of Sweden
This position paper focuses on goals and targets in the Swedish national climate 
policy. Church of Sweden will present a position paper on climate and 
development in 2008, which will discuss support to climate change mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries.
Introduction
The position of Church of Sweden on climate policy has its starting point in a 
long-standing commitment to the climate issue within the framework of the 
World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC has a consultative status to the 
United Nations (UN) and has participated as an NGO-representative in the 
negotiations within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) since the Convention was signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Church 
of Sweden has on several occasions participated in the WCC delegation at 
these meetings. The position is also based on the Guidelines for the 
international department’s work on climate issues and on statements 
delivered by Church of Sweden to the Swedish government. 1
As will be seen from these documents Church of Sweden believes that Sweden 
should act from a perspective of global justice in decisions and negotiations 
concerning climate change. Further, Church of Sweden stresses the urgency 
for Sweden to pursue a forceful climate policy nationally, as well as internatio-
nally, and that early action in the climate issues are of decisive importance.
Church of Sweden sees climate change as an issue of fundamental global 
importance for the future, from an environmental perspective as well as from 
a justice and development perspective. Climate change is an obvious 
example of how all people belong together. It embraces important issues of 
1  Comments to reports related to the checkpoint for climate policy, Dnr Ks 2004:0684; Comments 
to the report “Sweden’s environmental objectives – a shared responsibility” by the Environmental 
Objectives Council; Comments to Checkpoint 2008. The development of the Swedish strategy on 
climate change (all documents in Swedish).
equity between rich and poor countries, between those who are affected by the 
large emissions and those who cause them.
The development of the climate issue
The reports that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the 
UN published in the spring of 2007 showed that researchers now can predict 
with greater certainty that climate change is ongoing, that it happens faster 
than was earlier believed and that its effects may be much more dramatic than 
earlier expected. The recommendations made by IPCC on the pace by which 
greenhouse gases must be reduced have also been sharpened. In order to have 
a fair chance to reach the goal of maximum two degrees increase of the average 
temperature, IPCC considers that the global emissions have to reach their 
maximum in 2015 and thereafter be reduced with 50-85 percent by 2050.
The Swedish government’s Scientific Council on Climate Issues presented its 
report in September 2007. The Council had the possibility to consider more 
recent research than IPCC and argued that the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere has to be stabilised at 400 ppm CO2 equivalents in 
order for the world to have a fair chance to reach the two degrees goal. This 
suggestion can be compared with Sweden’s long-term environmental goal for 
the climate, which in 2002 was settled at 550 ppm, as well as with the fact that 
IPCC in the spring of 2007 claimed the necessity of a stabilisation at 400-450 
ppm.
The great attention to climate change in the media during the last year has, 
in combination with extreme weather conditions, contributed to an increased 
public awareness of the climate issue. Today there is a greater preparedness 
of politicians and the public, as well as in the business community, to meet the 
challenges that climate change present. Church of Sweden has in this context a 
special responsibility to draw attention to the global effects of climate change, 
but also to inspire and motivate people to change their life style.
 
A new global agreement after the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol under United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. The 
treaty expires in 2012, and for a new treaty to come into effect before that, it is 
considered necessary that a new agreement is reached during 2009. 
Discussions in preparation for this take place annually at Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP) but 
also in a number of other contexts, such as the G8 and the UN Security Council. 
EU hopes that a new agreement will be reached at COP15 that will be held in 
Copenhagen in the end of 2009. As the meeting takes place during Sweden’s EU 
Presidency, Sweden may play a historical key-role in these negotiations.
The climate policy of Sweden
The Swedish government intends to present a government bill on climate 
policy in 2008. The goals and strategies established there will serve as the 
basis for Sweden’s actions within the climate negotiations in the EU and the 
UN. “Checkpoint 2008” – a follow-up of the Swedish climate strategy prepared 
by a number of government authorities – will serve as the basis for the go-
vernment bill, together with the results of three special government initiatives: 
The Commission for Sustainable Development, the Scientific Council on 
Climate Issues, and the Parliamentary Drafting Committee on Climate.
Climate policy goals and targets
The present climate strategy of Sweden was decided upon by the 
Parliament in 2002. The goals were then established that the 
concentration of greenhouse gases will not exceed 550 ppm in 2050, that 
the Swedish per capita emissions will not exceed 4,5 tons by 2050, and 
that the Swedish emissions will be four percent lower in 2008-2012 than in 
1990.
In 2005 the Swedish emissions were seven percent lower than in 1990. 
This reduction had taken place at the same time as GDP increased with 36 
percent since 1990.
In its climate policy bill of 2006 the government estimated that the 
Swedish emissions ought to be reduced with 25 percent by 2020.
In their basic data for “Checkpoint 2008” the Swedish Energy Agency and 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency presuppose that Sweden’s 
emissions will be reduced with 25-30 percent by 2020.
In the spring of 2007 the EU heads of states agreed to reduce EU’s 
emissions with 30 percent within 2020 on the condition that other 
industrial countries make comparable commitments.
In August of 2007 the German government announced its intentions to 
reduce Germany’s emissions with 40 percent until 2020.
During the climate talks within the UN framework in August 2007 it was 
recognised that avoiding the most catastrophic forecasts made by the 
IPCC would entail emission reductions in the range of 25-40 percent below 
1990 levels by industrial countries.
1990 is used as base year for the calculations of emission reductions.
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Longer-term goals
Church of Sweden insists that the goal to limit the average increase in tempe-
rature to two degrees should remain. However, it should be stressed that even 
such an increase in temperature might have very serious consequences.
A longer-term climate goal is needed that comprises both Sweden’s national 
emissions and the average per capita emissions. The national goal will be a 
target that describes the comprehensive mitigation that has to take place, 
while the per capita goal will be a pedagogic means to illustrate these changes 
on an individual level and to illustrate global justice.
The goal should be that Swedish emissions are reduced with 90 percent by 
2050. This estimate is based on a) IPCC’s calculations that the global CO2 
emissions have to be reduced with 50-85 percent compared to today’s level 
(2000) by 2050, b) the forecast that the global population in 2050 is estimated 
to amount to 10 billion people and c) the assumption that the average per 
capita emissions, from a perspective of global justice, in the long run should 
be on the same level, irrespective of nationality. The remaining 10 percent 
should be covered by purchase of emission reduction units from projects in 
developing countries, similar to the direction of the Norwegian government. 2
The Swedish per capita goal in 2050 should be one ton carbon dioxide 
equivalents, even if a reduction of 90 percent leads to a somewhat lower re-
duction of the emission of greenhouse gases. From a pedagogic point of view 
one ton per person is an important goal.
Emission targets for 2020 – mitigation both in Sweden and abroad
The arguments for a reduction of emissions in Sweden are often that the rich 
countries, which so far have been causing most of the climate change, have 
to take the responsibility for their own emissions and at the same time show 
that it is possible to combine economic growth with reduced emissions. Other 
arguments are that Sweden, as well as other industrial countries, sooner or 
later will have to reduce their emissions radically. To postpone the 
transformation of society will in the long run be more expensive than to start 
immediately. The arguments for reducing emissions abroad are often that it 
is more cost efficient in the short run to implement measures in developing 
countries, and that is necessary to transfer technology in order to avoid large 
emission increases in the future.
2 Norway has indicated that it will take responsibility for a reduction of the world’s emissions at a 
level corresponding to 100 percent of all Norwegian emissions.
This means that the starting point for the Swedish climate strategy should be 
that Sweden both takes the lead and reduces emission considerably within our 
own country and at the same time contributes to emission reductions abroad, 
especially in developing countries. This strategy should be highlighted through 
the formulation of separate emission targets that complement each other: 
on the one hand emission targets for reductions in Sweden, on the other hand 
targets for reductions that are reached through the flexible mechanisms as 
defined in the Kyoto Protocol. 
Emission target for Sweden: minus 40 percent by 2020
Sweden should raise its level of ambition in its climate policy and establish a 
target that emissions should be reduced with 40 percent by 2020, including the 
allowances to the so-called trading sector. 3 There are several reasons for this:
-> According to IPCC a higher speed is needed in the global actions on 
climate if we are to reach the long-term goal for 2050 by reducing emissions at 
a steady rate rather than pushing the problems ahead of us to the next 
generation. A reduction by 40 percent until 2020 gives a steady rate of about 
three percent emission reductions per year until 2050. 4
-> Sweden’s experiences from the climate policy that has been implemented 
so far show that it has been easier to reach established targets than expected. 
The present target of four percent lower emissions in 2010 than in 1990 was 
reached several years in advance, although the target had been sharpened 
during the implementation period. Therefore we should not be afraid of aiming 
high. It can also be noted that during last year’s vivid public debate on climate 
change a number of business executives, in Sweden as well as internationally, 
said that the business community is ready to develop new energy technology 
and “climate friendly” products rapidly. However, without distinct directions 
from politicians in the form of targets and policy instruments the necessary 
investments may not be made. 
-> A target of 40 percent is a clear but realistic increase of Sweden’s earlier 
level of ambition. It can, for example, be noted that if the total number of cars 
3 Big installations in industrial and energy production within the so-called trading sector are 
included in EU’s system for emission trading. This means that the emission reductions to which 
these companies commit themselves can be accomplished either at their own plants or, if that is 
cheaper, by purchase of emission allowances. The emission reductions are then accomplished by 
other companies within the system, that is, somewhere within the EU.
  The Scientific Council has proposed emission reductions in Sweden by 20-25 percent, which is a 
lower level than Sweden and the EU have expressed so far. A lowered level of ambition according 
to the proposal of the Council, however, implies that the rate of emission reductions will be very 
low within 2020, slightly more than one percent per year, and then dramatically rise to more than 
five percent per year between 2020 and 2050. This means that the costs are postponed to future 
generations.
in Sweden would reduce the emissions to an average of 120 g per kilometre, 
which is EU’s goal for new cars, the carbon dioxide emissions would be 
reduced with about 5.5 million tons. 5
-> The reduction of emissions will in practice be considerably lower than 40 
percent. One of the reasons is that 1990 is used as base year, and already 
today the emissions are lower than at that time. Another reason is that the 
considerable increase of emissions from the use of bunker oil in Sweden for 
international shipping and air transport is not included, in accordance with the 
reporting rules in the Kyoto Protocol. Besides, the emission reductions only 
include the emissions in the country and not the emissions that are caused 
by import. If these emissions, after deduction for emissions from Sweden’s 
export, would be included the emissions caused by Sweden might be double as 
much as stated. 6
-> Sweden has a historically important role to play during its EU presidency in 
2009 when the next major climate negotiations will be finalized. It is of utmost 
importance that Sweden can push for ambitious global emission targets in the 
international negotiations from a position where our national policy is ambi-
tious, credible an equitable, and where Sweden can show that it is possible to 
combine reduced emissions with high welfare and economic growth.
Emission reductions in developing countries: corresponding to 40 percent
Investments in emission reducing measures in developing countries through 
so-called flexible mechanisms – CDM-projects or, in transitional economies, 
through JI-projects7  – lead to transfer of new technology to developing 
countries at the same time as the global emissions of greenhouse gases can 
be reduced in a more cost efficient way.
It is necessary to guarantee that these projects really result in sustainable 
development and transfer of technology. The flexible mechanisms should 
concentrate on projects that involve investments in renewable energy and 
increased energy efficiency, and they should lead to local environmental 
benefits and be a channel for transfer of technology in the climate field. It 
is important that Sweden in its engagement in CDM-projects makes high 
demands on the aim of the projects and their contribution to a sustainable 
development.
5  At present, Sweden’s emissions are 67 million ton per year.
6  Koldioxidutsläpp till följd av Sveriges import och konsumtion (Carbon dioxide emissions as a 
consequence of Sweden’s import and consumtion), Annika Carlsson Kanyama, KTH, May, 2007, 
http://www.ima.kth.se/eng/respublic/CO2_utslaepp_import_konsumtion.pdf
7  Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation are the flexible mechanisms that are 
included in the Kyoto Protocol and that can be used by the OECD countries in order to fulfil some 
of their commitments
The support to CDM-projects should be raised considerably, so that Sweden 
achieves as big emission reductions in the developing countries as we do 
domestically. The support should amount to 20.3 million ton reduction units, 
corresponding to 40 percent of the Swedish emissions in 19908. It should not 
be financed within the budget for development cooperation.
Conclusion
The Church of Sweden considers it to be of great importance to co-operate 
within Sweden as well as between the countries and peoples in the world 
concerning the great challenge that the global warming constitutes. Through 
early and powerful measures Sweden can take a global responsibility to se-
cure a sustainable future for present and future generations
8  The total cost for this, starting from the price levels calculated with by the Swedish Environmen-
tal Protection Agency and the Swedish Energy Agency in the basic data for Checkpoint 2008, would 
amount to 3 billion SEK per year, corresponding to ca 0.1 percent of Swedish GDP.
Global warming and a dramatic reduction in the earth’s biological richness and 
diversity have created an ecological imbalance, threatening the livelihoods of local 
communities. More extreme weather conditions and the increased frequency of 
droughts, floods and other disasters contribute to reduced food and water 
security, the increased spread of diseases, more climate refugees, and a struggle 
for ever more scant resources. Conflicts of interest over control of natural 
resources are aggravating relations between various parties and increasing the 
risk of armed conflict. Peaceful coexistence is threatened by a shortage of water 
and food. Climate change speaks directly to poverty. Few other single issues 
present such a danger to the future welfare of the world’s poor.
Those who currently emit the least greenhouse gases are those who are most 
affected by climate changes. Poor countries have less resources and a weaker 
ability to adapt and are therefore more vulnerable. Norwegian Church Aid and 
Church of Sweden are now intensifying our advocacy work on the issue of climate 
change. We advocate that rich countries must bear the main responsibility for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and facilitate the development and transfer of 
climate-friendly technology that will benefit developing countries. It is no longer 
possible to ignore climate change adaptation as an element in development work. 
Increased support for developing countries that will enable them to adjust to 
climate change is urgently needed. We also add our voices to those that demand 
that governments across the globe, and in particular our own governments, 
demonstrate bold leadership in working for a responsible and ambitious 
post-Kyoto agreement. 
We believe that human beings have a duty to manage our natural resources and 
the global environment in a sustainable manner so we do not jeopardize the lives 
of future generations. God has given the earth, nature and the environment to 
the whole of mankind. No one generation or group has the right to exploit these 
resources for their own greed or at the cost of future generations.
Norwegian Church Aid and Church of Sweden hope this publication will provide 
perspectives and insight for the readers and add another perspective to the 
debate on climate change and stimulate much needed action.
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